Supreme Court Of India Bench Consiting Of Justice R.V. Raveendran And Justice A K Patnaik In T.G. Ashok Kumar VS Govindammal & Anr., Decided on 08-12-2010, The principle underlying Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is clear. During the pendency in a court of competent jurisdiction of any suit which is not collusive, in which any right of an immovable property is directly and specifically in question, such property cannot be transferred by any party to the suit so as to affect the rights of any other party to the suit under any decree that may be made in such suit. If ultimately the title of the pendente lite transferor is upheld in regard to the transferred property, the transferee's title will not be affected. On the other hand, if the title of the pendente lite transferor is recognized or accepted only in regard to a part of the transferred property, then the transferee's title will be saved only in regard to that extent and the transfer in regard to the remaining portion of the transferred property to which the transferor is found not entitled, will be invalid and the transferee will not get any right, title or interest in that portion. If the property transferred pendente lite, is allotted in entirety to some other party or parties or if the transferor is held to have no right or title in that property, the transferee will not have any title to the property. Where a co-owner alienates a property or a portion of a property representing to be the absolute owner, equities can no doubt be adjusted while making the division during the final decree proceedings, if feasible and practical (that is without causing loss or hardship or inconvenience to other parties) by allotting the property or portion of the property transferred pendente lite, to the share of the transferor, so that the bonafide transferee's right and title are saved fully or partially.


Absence of a mechanism for prospective purchasers to verify whether a property is subject to any pending suit or a decree or attachment cause lot of hardship, loss, anxiety and unnecessary litigation. At present, a prospective purchaser can find out about any existing encumbrance over a property either by inspection of the Registration Registers or by securing a certificate relating to encumbrances (that is copies of entries in the Registration Registers) from the jurisdictional Sub-Registrar under Section 57 of the Registration Act, 1908. But a prospective purchaser has no way to ascertain whether there is any suit or proceeding pending in respect of the property, if the person offering the property for sale does not disclose it or deliberately suppresses the information. The inconveniences, risks, hardships and misery as a result of such transfers could be avoided and the property litigations could be reduced to a considerable extent, if there is some satisfactory and reliable method by which a prospective purchaser can ascertain whether any suit is pending (or whether the property is subject to any decree or attachment) before he decides to purchase the property. A solution has been found to this problem in the States of Maharashtra by an appropriate local amendment to section 52 of the Act, by Bombay Act 4 of 1939. The Law Commission and the Parliament must consider such amendment or other suitable amendment to cover the existing void in title verification or due diligence procedures. Provision can also be made for compulsory registration of such notices in respect of decrees and in regard to attachments of immoveable properties.

At present in most of the States, agreements to sell are not compulsorily registrable as they do not involve transfer of any right, title or interest in an immoveable property. Registration of agreements of sale will reduce property litigation. It will go a long way to discourage generation and circulation of black money in real estate matters, as also undervaluation of documents for purposes of stamp duty. It will also discourage the growth of land mafia and muscleman who dominate the real estate scene in various parts of the country.


Supreme Court Of India Bench Consiting Of Justice R.V. Raveendran And Justice Aftab Alam In Man Kaur Vs Hartar Singh Sangha Decided on 05-10-2010 “The attorney-holder cannot depose or give evidence in place of his principal for the acts done by the principal or transactions or dealings of the principal, of which principal alone has personal knowledge. Where the principal at no point of time had personally handled or dealt with or participated in the transaction and has no personal knowledge of the transaction, and where the entire transaction has been handled by an attorney- holder, necessarily the attorney-holder alone can give evidence in regard to the transaction. This frequently happens in case of principals carrying on business through authorized managers/attorney-holders or person residing abroad managing their affairs through their attorney-holders.” - Evidence Act, 1872 - Ss. 101,106,145 and 114 111. (g) - Adverse presumption - Reiterated, where a party to the suit does not appear in witness box and state his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that case set up by him is not correct-Specific Relief Act, 1963, Ss. 15 and 16(c).


Supreme Court of India in DR. SHEHLA BURNEY & ORS Vs. SYED ALI MOSSA RAZA (DEAD) BY LRS.& ORS. Coram of Justice : G.S. SINGHVI, Justice : ASOK KUMAR GANGULY held that the relief of possession could not be granted against the 2nd defendant as it was neither pleaded nor prayed for – Granting relief that was not prayed for goes to the root of the matter and could be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court – Appeal was allowed, decree passed by the High Court was set aside and that of the trial Court was confirmed.


Justice P.P. Naolekar & Justice Aftab Alam bench in a case of Mahant Dooj Das (Dead) through L.Rs. v. Udasin Panchayati Bara Akhara & Anr.; Reported in 2008(5) Supreme 425, & 2008 (7) SCR 470
The Uttar Pradesh Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956 received the assent of the President on 7.3.1957 and was published in the U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 12.3.1957. The Act was brought into force to provide for the abolition of Zamindari system in agricultural areas situated in urban areas of U.P. and for acquisition of the rights, title and interest of the intermediaries between the tiller of the soil and the State in such areas and for introduction of the land reforms therein. By virtue of s.8 of 1956 Act, after the agricultural area has been demarcated under s.5, the State Government would issue a notification in the official gazette declaring that from specified date all demarcated area situated in the urban area shall vest with the State Government and from the date so specified all such agricultural area shall be transferred to and vest except otherwise provided, in the State free from all encumbrances. There is no evidence led by the defendants that the suit land had been declared as a demarcated area and as such as vested with the State government under s.8 of the 1956 Act. In the absence of proof, it cannot be said that the suit area is a demarcated area and thus vested in the State by issuance of the notification under s.8 of the Act.

No evidence has been led by the defendants on whom heavy burden lies to prove the fact that the suit lands were declared demarcated. The defendants have claimed ouster of the civil court's jurisdiction only on the basis of s.331 of the 1950 Act incorporated in the 1956 Act. The defendants having failed to prove the applicability of that provision to the area in the suit, civil court's jurisdiction cannot be said to have been ousted and vested in the revenue court.

Under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which there is a bar expressly or impliedly provided. It is well settled principle that a party seeking to oust jurisdiction of an ordinary civil court shall establish the right to do so. It is also settled law that exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. The provisions of law which seek to oust the jurisdiction of civil court need to be strictly construed.

In Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) by LRs. v. Ramesh Chander Agarwal and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 220, a 3-Judge Bench has held that Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction upon the civil courts to determine all disputes of civil nature unless the same is barred under a statute either expressly or by necessary implication. Bar of jurisdiction of a civil court is not to be readily inferred. A provision seeking to bar jurisdiction of a civil court requires strict interpretation. The court, it is well settled, would normally lean in favour of construction, which would uphold retention of jurisdiction of the civil court. The burden of proof in this behalf shall be on the party who asserts that the civil court’s jurisdiction is ousted.


Justice A Pasayat, and Justice S Kapadia in a case of Novva ads v. Secretary, Department of Municipal Administration & Water Supply & Another; Reported in AIR 2008 SC 2941, (2008) 8 SCC 42 “It is well settled that a delegated legislation would have to be read in the context of the primary statute under which it is made and, in case of any conflict, it is primary legislation that will prevail.” The State has a full right to regulate the public places, as they vest in the State as trustees for the public. The State can impose such limitations on the user of public places as may be necessary to protect the public generally. Hoardings erected on private places require to be licensed and regulated as they generally abut on and are visible on public roads and public places. Hoarding erected on a private building may obstruct public roads when put up on private buildings; they may be dangerous to the building and to the public; they may be hazardous and dangerous to the smooth flow of traffic by distracting traffic, and their content may be obscene or objectionable. It is, therefore, not correct that hoardings on private places do not require to be regulated by licensing provisions.


A delegated legislation can be declared invalid by the Court mainly on two grounds: firstly, that it violates any provision of the Constitution and secondly, it is violative of the enabling Act. If the delegate which has been given a rule-making authority exceeds its authority and makes any provision inconsistent with the Act and thus overrides it, it can be held to be a case of violating the provisions of the enabling Act but where the enabling Act itself permits ancillary and subsidiary functions of the legislature to be performed by the executive as its delegate, the delegated legislation cannot be held to be in violation of the enabling Act. [See vide State of M.P. v. Bhola (2003) 3 SCC 1]

In St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, National Council for Teacher Education and Another (2003) 3 SCC 321, this Court has held that: "Delegated legislation permits utilization of experience and consultation with interests affected by the practical operation of statutes. Rules and Regulations made by reason of the specific power conferred by the Statutes to make Rules and Regulations establish the pattern of conduct to be followed. Regulations are in aid of enforcement of the provisions of the Statute. The process of legislation by departmental Regulations saves time and is intended to deal with local variations and the power to legislate by statutory instrument in the form of Rules and Regulations is conferred by Parliament. The main justification for delegated legislation is that the legislature being over burdened and the needs of the modern day society being complex it can not possibly foresee every administrative difficulty that may arise after the Statute has begun to operate. Delegated legislation fills those needs".


Justice S.H. Kapadia and Justice B. Sudershan Reddy in a case of City and Industrial Development Corporation vs Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala & Ors. Reported in AIR 2009 SC 571,
FACT:- The High Court mostly relied upon the oral statement made through the A.G.P. and also some vague averments made by the appellant in its reply affidavit to the effect that the land in question is a private land and accordingly disposed of the Writ Petition directing the acquisition of the land. There is no whisper in the impugned order of the High Court that the Bhiwandiwala Trust continued to be the true and absolute owner of the land possessing valid and subsisting title as on the date of the filing of the writ petition. Nor there is any finding by the High Court as regards the nature of the land which is one of the most important factor that may have a vital bearing on the issue as to the entitlement of the respondent to get any relief in the writ petition. There is also no finding that Respondent No.1 who filed the writ petition as an individual is the trustee of the said trust and thus entitled to prosecute the litigation on behalf of the trust. The High Court did not consider as to what is the effect of filing of the Writ Petition by someone claiming to be a trustee without impleading the trust as the petitioner. The High Court ignored the statement made by the respondent in his Writ Petition about his representation to Tehsildar requiring to record his name as an "heir". The High Court never considered the effect of such a statement made by the writ petitioner in the writ petition itself. The High Court also did not consider whether the reliefs claimed could at all be granted in a public law remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Such a statement by itself cannot confer title in respect of immovable properties on any individual. The courts are not relieved of their burden to weigh and evaluate the relevancy and effect of such statements in adjudicating the lis between the parties.
The High Court ought to have considered whether there was any suppression of material facts from the Court. Having regard to the magnitude and complexity of the case the High Court in all fairness ought to have directed the official respondents to file their detailed counter affidavits and produce the entire material and the records in their possession for its consideration.
The stance adopted by the State of Maharashtra and the District Collector is stranger than fiction. It is difficult to discern as to why they remained silent spectators without effectively participating in the proceedings before the Court. No explanation is forthcoming as to why they have chosen not to file their replies to the Writ Petition in the High Court.
Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of a High Court to issue appropriate writs particularly a writ of Mandamus is highly discretionary. The relief cannot be claimed as of right. One of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the High Court is guilty of unexplained delay and the laches. Inordinate delay in moving the court for a Writ is an adequate ground for refusing a Writ. The principle is that courts exercising public law jurisdiction do not encourage agitation of stale claims and exhuming matters where the rights of third parties may have accrued in the interregnum.
The High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty bound to take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration and decide for itself even in the absence of proper affidavits from the State and its instrumentalities as to whether any case at all is made out requiring its interference on the basis of the material made available on record.
There is nothing like issuing an ex-parte writ of Mandamus, order or direction in a public law remedy. Further, while considering validity of impugned action or inaction the court will not consider itself restricted to the pleadings of the State but would be free to satisfy itself whether any case as such is made out by a person invoking its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty bound to consider whether :
(a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can
be satisfactorily resolved;
(b) petition reveals all material facts;
(c)the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute;
(d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches;
(e) ex facie barred by any laws of Limitation;
(f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors.

The Court in appropriate cases in its discretion may direct the State or its instrumentalities as the case may be to file proper affidavits placing all the relevant facts truly and accurately for the consideration of the court and particularly in cases where public revenue and public interest are involved. Such directions always are required to be complied with by the State. No relief could be granted in a public law remedy as a matter of course only on the ground that the State did not file its counter affidavit opposing the writ petition. Further, empty and self-defeating affidavits or statements of Government spokesmen by themselves do not form basis to grant any relief to a person in a public remedy to which he is not otherwise entitled to in law.
It will not be appropriate to dispose of the matter without one word about the conduct of the State Government reflecting highly unsatisfactory state of affairs. This Court expresses its grave concern as to the manner in which State has conducted in this case. It is the constitutional obligation and duty of the State to place true and relevant facts by filing proper affidavits enabling the court to discharge its constitutional duties. The State and other authorities are bound to produce the complete records relating to the case once Rule is issued by the court. It is needless to remind the Governments that they do not enjoy the same amount of discretion as that of a private party even in the matter of conduct of litigation. The Governments do not enjoy any unlimited discretion in this regard. No one needs to remind the State that they represent the collective will of the society.

The State in the present case instead of filing its affidavit through higher officers of the Government utilised the lower ones to make oral statements and that too through its A.G.P. in the High Court. This malady requires immediate remedy. It is hoped that the Government shall conduct itself in a responsible manner and assist the High Court by placing the true and relevant facts by filing a proper affidavit and documents that may be available with it.


JUSTICE R. V. Raveendran AND JUSTICE A. K. Patnaik in K.K. VELUSAMY VS N.PALANISAMY Reported in 2011 (4) SCALE 61
1. Ideally, the recording of evidence should be continuous, followed by arguments, without any gap. Courts should constantly endeavour to follow such a time schedule. The amended Code expects them to do so. If that is done, applications for adjournments, re-opening, recalling, or interim measures could be avoided.

2. If the party had an opportunity to produce such evidence earlier but did not do so or if the evidence already led is clear and unambiguous, or if it comes to the conclusion that the object of the application is merely to protract the proceedings, the court should reject the application.

3. If the evidence sought to be produced is an electronic record, the court may also listen to the recording before granting or rejecting the application.

4. If the application is found to be mischievous, or frivolous, or to cover up negligence or lacunae, it should be rejected with heavy costs.

5. If the application is allowed and the evidence is permitted and ultimately the court finds that evidence was not genuine or relevant and did not warrant the reopening of the case recalling the witnesses, it can be made a ground for awarding exemplary costs apart from ordering prosecution if it involves fabrication of evidence.

6. Where the application is found to be bona fide and where the additional evidence, oral or documentary, will assist the court to clarify the evidence on the issues and will assist in rendering justice, and the court is satisfied that non-production earlier was for valid and sufficient reasons, the court may exercise its discretion to recall the witnesses or permit the fresh evidence.

7. The court should take up and complete the case within a fixed time schedule so that the delay is avoided.

8. The convention that no application should be entertained once the trial or hearing is concluded and the case is reserved for judgment is a sound rule, but not a straitjacket formula. There can always be exceptions in exceptional or extra-ordinary circumstances, to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court, subject to the limitation recognized with reference to exercise of power under section 151 of the Code.

Settled Possesssion - Title Goes With Possession 2003 SC

JUSTICE R.C. Lahoti, JUSTICE B.N. Srikrishna & JUSTICE G.P. Mathur in RAME GOWDA (D) BY LRS. .Vs. M. VARADAPPA NAIDU (D) BY LRS. & ANR. Reported in 2004(1) SCC 769 “It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of he cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.”


Justice Dr. Arijit Pasayat & Justice S. H. Kapadia in case of SUBHODKUMAR & ORS. .Vs. BHAGWANT NAMDEORAO MEHETRE & ORS. Reported in AIR 2007 SC 1324, A Karta of Hindu Undivided Family had five sons. The Karta and four sons entered into an agreement of sale with respondents for selling part of their ancestral lands and thereafter executed a sale deed. The fifth son opposed the transaction and entered into a separate agreement of sale for selling part of the sold lands with appellants. The respondents-plaintiff filed a suit for possession of lands before trial court contending that the agreement entered into by the opposing son with the appellants-defendants was a fabricated antedated document. The appellants contested the suit contending that their agreement of sale was genuine and first in point of time: that they were not aware of the agreement executed by the Karta in favour of the respondents: and that the transaction was not for legal necessity. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the transaction was for legal necessity. The appellate court also dismissed the appeal but held that the legal necessity for possession was not a `fact in issue' The High Court dismissed the second Appeal of the appellants holding that the transaction was on account of legal necessity. In appeal to this court, the appellants contended that there was no legal necessity for the Karta and his four sons to execute the conveyance in favour of the respondents; that the conveyance was executed without the consent of one of the coparceners; that the opposing son entered into a conveyance with them in respect of his undivided share and was it earlier in point of time. Dismissing the appeal, the Court. HELD: A karta has power to alienate for value the joint family property either for necessity or all the coparceners of the family. When he alienates for legal necessity interest. When the Karta, however, conveys by way of imprudent transaction, the alienation is voidable to the extent of the undivided share of the non-consenting coparcener. Neither the opposing son nor his successors-in-title instituted a suit for partition and for demarcation of their share by metes and bounds. In the suit for possession filed by the respondents, the issue of legal necessity becomes irrelevant. A mere declaration that transaction was imprudent or was not for legal necessity in such a suit cannot give any right to the appellants to get their share without taking appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. The legal necessity in the present suit for possession was not a "fact in issue".


JUSTICE DR. B.S. CHAUHAN and JUSTICE SWATANTER KUMAR in SUBHADRA & ORS. .Vs. THANKAM Reported in AIR 2010 SC 3031, “The relief of rectification can be claimed where it is through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties that real intention of the parties is not expressed in relation to an instrument. Even then the party claiming will have to make specific pleadings and claim an issue in that behalf…………… The plea of the appellant that since no relief for rectification has been prayed, the decree for specific performance ought not to be granted is not tenable. Section 26(4) of the Act only says that no relief for the rectification of an instrument shall be granted to any party under this section unless it has been specifically claimed. However, proviso to Section 26(4) of the Act makes it clear that when such a relief has not been claimed by the concerned parties, the Court shall, at any stage of the proceedings allow him to amend the pleadings on such terms, as may be just, for including such a claim and it would be necessary for the party to file a separate suit. The legislative intent in incorporating this provision, therefore, is unambiguous and clear. The purpose is not to generate multiplicity of litigation but to decide all issues in relation thereto in the same suit provided the provisions of Section 26 of the Act are attracted in the facts of a given case.”


Justice Tarun Chatterjee and Justice V.S.Sirpurkar in a case of SREE SWAYAM PRAKASH ASHRAMAM & ANR. .Vs. G. ANANDAVALLY AMMA & ORS. Reported in AIR 2010 SC 622, The case of the defendants-appellants that since there was no mention in the deed of settlement enabling the use of `B' schedule pathway for access to `A' schedule property and the building therein, cannot be the reason to hold that there was no grant as the grant could be by implication as well. The facts and circumstances of the case amply show that there was an implied grant in favour of the original plaintiff (since deceased) relating to `B' schedule property of the plaint for its use as pathway to `A' schedule property of the plaint in residential occupation of the original plaintiff (since deceased). In absence of any evidence being adduced by the appellants to substantiate their contention that the original plaintiff (since deceased) had an alternative pathway for access to the `A' schedule property, it is difficult to negative the contention of the respondent that since the original plaintiff (since deceased) has been continuously using the said pathway at least from the year 1940 the original plaintiff (since deceased) had acquired an easement right by way of an implied grant in respect of the `B' Schedule property of the plaint. The High Court was perfectly justified in holding that when it was the desire of `Y' to grant easement right to the original plaintiff (since deceased) by way of an implied grant, the right of the original plaintiff (since deceased) to have `B' schedule property of the plaint as a pathway could not have been taken away. The High Court was fully justified in holding that there was implied grant of `B' schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that no other pathway was provided for access to `A' schedule property of the plaint and there was no objection also to the use of `B' schedule property of the plaint as pathway by the original plaintiff (since deceased) at least up to 1982, when alone the cause of action for the suit arose.

The Trial Court on consideration of the plaintiff's evidence and when the defendant had failed to produce any evidence, had come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was given right of easement by `Y' as an easement of grant. Considering this aspect of the matter, although there is no specific issue on the question of implied grant, but as the parties have understood their case and for the purpose of proving and contesting implied grant had adduced evidence, the Trial Court and the High Court had come to the conclusion that the plaintiff had acquired a right of easement in respect of `B' schedule pathway by way of implied grant. Such being the position, this Court cannot upset the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below, in exercise of its powers under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is true that the defendant-appellants alleged that no implied grant was pleaded in the plaint. However, the Trial Court was justified in holding that such pleadings were not necessary when it did not make a difference to the finding arrived at with respect to the easement by way of grant.


Justice R.V. Raveendran, Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan in Municipal Corporation of Delhi VS Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy & Ors. Decided on 13 October, 2011 In a case, where life and personal liberty have been violated the absence of any statutory provision for compensation in the Statute is of no consequence. Right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is the most sacred right preserved and protected under the Constitution, violation of which is always actionable and there is no necessity of statutory provision as such for preserving that right. Article 21 of the Constitution of India has to be read into all public safety statutes, since the prime object of public safety legislation is to protect the individual and to compensate him for the loss suffered. Duty of care expected from State or its officials functioning under the public safety legislation is, therefore, very high, compared to the statutory powers and supervision expected from officers functioning under the statutes like Companies Act, Cooperative Societies Act and such similar legislations. When we look at the various provisions of the Cinematographic Act, 1952 and the Rules made thereunder, the Delhi Building Regulations and the Electricity Laws the duty of care on officials was high and liabilities strict.

Law is well settled that a Constitutional Court can award monetary compensation against State and its officials for its failure to safeguard fundamental rights of citizens but there is no system or method to measure the damages caused in such situations. Quite often the courts have a difficult task in determining damages in various fact situations. The yardsticks normally adopted for determining the compensation payable in a private tort claims are not as such applicable when a constitutional court determines the compensation in cases where there is violation of fundamental rights guaranteed to its citizens.

This Court in Union of India v. Prabhakaran (2008) (9) SCC 527, extended the principle to cover public utilities like the railways, electricity distribution companies, public corporations and local bodies which may be social utility undertakings not working for private profit. In Prabhakaran (supra) a woman fell on a railway track and was fatally run over and her husband demanded compensation. Railways argued that she was negligent as she tried to board a moving train. Rejecting the plea of the Railways, this Court held that her "contributory negligence" should not be considered in such untoward incidents - the railways has "strict liability". A strict liability in torts, private or constitutional do not call for a finding of intent or negligence. In such a case highest degree of care is expected from private and public bodies especially when the conduct causes physical injury or harm to persons. The question as to whether the law imposes a strict liability on the state and its officials primarily depends upon the purpose and object of the legislation as well. When activities are hazardous and if they are inherently dangerous the statute expects highest degree of care and if someone is injured because of such activities, the State and its officials are liable even if they could establish that there was no negligence and that it was not intentional. Public safety legislations generally falls in that category of breach of statutory duty by a public authority. To decide whether the breach is actionable, the Court must generally look at the statute and its provisions and determine whether legislature in its wisdom intended to give rise to a cause of action in damages and whether the claimant is intended to be protected.


JUSTICE R.V. Raveendran, JUSTICE A.K. Patnaik in Trambakeshwar Devasthan Trust & ... vs President Purohit Sangh & Ors. Decided on 13 October, 2011 “By the very nature of the activities in a place used as a place of public religious worship and dedicated to or for the benefit of or used as of right by the Hindu community or any Section thereof, it is antithesis to a private and closed door management of its affairs. On the other hand there has to be complete openness and transparency in its administration and above all by observing democratic values or principles. To put it differently, it is public trust for the community, by the community and of the community or any section thereof. If such is the purport of the Trust then diversified representation and involvement of all concerned or the section of the pubic who have interest in the Trust and in particular associated with the day to day activities of the temple of the devasthan is inevitable - and the most appropriate step to further and promote the objectives of such a Trust…………………. A person can be said to be disqualified or would render himself unfit for being appointed as the trustees only when he has direct interest in the trust or the devasthan and is hostile to the affairs of the Trust and his object is to see that the Trust is destroyed. To put it differently, there is a perceptible difference between person having interest in the trust and person having conflict of interest. The former is the quintessence for being eligible to be considered or for being appointed as the trustee……………… Law is however well settled that the interest of the public is paramount in any religious public trust.”


SMT. ROSHAN DALVI, J of Bombay High Court, in Sadashiv Sakharam Patil & Ors vs Chandrakant Gopal Desale & Ors Judgment passed on 6 September, 2011 It is stated "Only on and from 9th September 2005 on which date the Amendment Act 39 of 2005 came into force that the daughter who was then living would become a coparcener."

In the case of Sugalabai Vs. Gundappa A. Maradi & Ors. ILR 2007 KAR 4790 the first three words of the aforesaid section came to be considered and interpreted in paragraph 24. It has been observed that the words "on and from" mean "immediately and after" - the commencement of the Act. It is observed that in other words as soon as the amending Act came into force the daughter of the coparcener becomes, by birth, a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son. In that case the change in law came into effect during the pendency of the Appeals. It was held that the changed law applied to pending Appeals and consequently, the said Appeal. Hence the daughter in that case was held to be the coparcener. It was observed that there was nothing in the Act which showed that only those born on and after the commencement of the Act would become coparceners. Hence it was held that even a daughter who was born prior to the amendment Act became a coparcener immediately on and after the Amendment Act.

This is the case where the daughters had already expired prior to the coming into force of the amendment Act and prior to any litigation, her son having filed the suit himself. There is nothing in the Section which shows that it would apply to all females retrospectively including a daughter who had expired prior to the coparcener himself, prior to any litigation and prior to the amendment Act itself. If such a daughter was also to be included the entire population would come to be included and the children and grandchildren of all deceased females would claim their share in the estate of their grandparents and great grandparents through their mother. It would have to be seen whether the legislation is capable of such an absurd interpretation.

The words "on" and "from" show and suggest that on a date prior to the Act coming into force the daughter (female) would not be included as a coparcener. Consequently, all daughters born to coparceners in a Hindu joint family living at the time the Act came into force would become coparcener. Daughters (females) who had expired a day prior thereto, unfortunately, could not, because they would be covered by the law prior to the amendment. If such interpretation is not given the words "on" and "from" "the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005" would lose their significance all together and would be rendered otiose.

This aspect is essentially decipherable from the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act cited above. This provision has been specifically enacted to lay down a cutoff date for the daughter of a coparcener to claim her right as a coparcener including her right of partition which is restricted by any disposition or alienation made prior to 20th December 2004. Hence when the Act came into force on 9th September 2004 partition could be claimed by a daughter, if the coparcenery property was not partitioned about nine months prior thereto. This shows that the earlier dispositions and alienations could not be challenged so that whilst the daughter was not a coparcener and certain rights were created they would stand. This is to lend stability to facts and circumstances that may have prevailed in innumerable families having joint family properties prior to the creation of the new right in favour of the daughter. Counsel on behalf of the original Plaintiff sought to show that the proviso has been held to be ultra vires the constitution by the Karnataka High Court which judgment shall be considered presently.

It has been held in the case of Pravat Chandra Pattnaik & Ors. Vs. Sarat Chandra Pattnaik & Anr. AIR 2008 Orissa 133 that the aforesaid Section was enacted for removing the gender discrimination that prevailed leading to oppression and negation of the fundamental right of equality to women and to render social justice by giving them equal status in the Society. The Act came into force from 9th September 2005 and the statutory provisions under Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 thereof created a new right. The provisions are not expressly made retrospective by the legislature. The Act is clear and there is no ambiguity. Therefore, words cannot be interpolated. They do not bear more than one meaning. The Act is therefore, prospective. It creates a substantive right in favour of the daughter. The daughter gets a rights of a coparcener from the date when the amended Act came into force. Consequently, the contention that only the daughters who were born after 2005 would be treated as coparceners was not accepted. It specifically clarifies that the daughter gets a right as a coparcener from the year 2005 whenever she may have been born. She can claim a partition of the property which was not partitioned earlier. However, the judgment specifies a rider. That is in view of the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act.

"But if the same was effected earlier i.e., prior to 20th December, 2004 the same should not be reopened."

It is, therefore, that it is rightly contended on behalf of the Defendants in the suit that Sakharam's succession opened on 4th October 1995 on that date his daughters Muktabai and/or Narmadabai were not coparceners. His coparcenery property would devolve by survivorship to his only son Sadashiv. The devolution of interest in the coparcenery property as specified in the sub- title/heading of Section 6 would take place only to the son. The words in the sub-title "devolution of interest" also therefore, show that for an interest to devolve upon a person that person must be alive. No devolution of interest in coparcenery property can take place upon a deceased coparcener. On the date of the death of Sakharam his daughters were not even coparceners; they were not even alive. No devolution of interest upon them could take place.

In the case of Sheela Devi & Ors. Vs. Lal Chand & Anr. (2006) 8 SCC 581 the Court considered the estate of one Babu Ram who died in the year 1989. He was one of the 5 sons of Tulsi Ram and one of the members of the coparcenery property. He left behind two sons and three daughters. Babu Ram had inherited 1/5th share of the property of his father and 1/20th share through another brother who had died intestate without issues. The succession between the two brothers and their descendants was in issue. The applicability of the Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 was under consideration. Though that is a different matter, observation in paragraph 21 of the judgment relates to the new Act of 2005. It was inter alia observed that the succession was opened in 1989 and hence the provisions of the amendment Act 2005 would have no application. Thereupon Section 6(1) of the old Act of 1956 which related to succession on the death of a coparcener in the event the heirs were only male descendants came to be considered.

My attention has been drawn by Counsel on behalf of the original Plaintiff to the judgment in the case of G. Sekar Vs. Geetha & Ors. (2009) 6 SCC 99 to show that this aspect has been negated in the later judgment of the Supreme Court. Paragraph 49 of the judgment extracts the case of Sheela Devi and the entire paragraph 21 thereof. It is observed that in the case of Sheela Devi the amendment Act had no application as the succession has opened prior to 1989 and hence that contention came to be negatived to consider and interpret the vesting of the right of the coparcener under the old Act. It is, therefore, entirely erroneous to contend upon reading the word "negatived" that the contention that upon the succession opening in 1989 the amendment would have no application was negatived without reading the entire paragraph 49 as a whole. It may be clarified that in the case of Sheela Devi upon the applicability of Section 6 of the old Act, the contention with regard to the applicability of the new Act was negatived and the old Section was considered. Consequently, the fact that succession did open in 1989 when Babu Ram died which did not make the new Act applicable was accepted. We would do well to read the two judgments together.

We are concerned with only the aspect of the applicability of the amendment Act on the date the succession opened. Since it was held that the new Act would not apply when succession opened prior to the date on which it came into force - in that case in 1989 - the Court considered Section 6 of the earlier Act.

In fact the observation in paragraph 8 of the judgment in the case of Miss. R. Kantha, d/o Doddarmaiah Reddy Vs. Union of India & Anr. AIR 2010 Karnataka 27 to which also my attention has been drawn by Counsel on behalf of the original Plaintiff would be material. It runs thus: "It follows, therefore, that the provisions of the Act can be enforced when the right to succession opens and not before. The petitioner's father is said to be alive and hence her right to succession as a co-parcener has not opened." In that case the Plaintiff/Petitioner applied for partition of the coparcenery property whilst her father was alive under Section 6 of the new Act of 2005 upon the premise that she, as a coparcener, was entitled to all the rights of coparcener including partition. Her father was alive at that time. It was held that Section 6 of the new Act of 2005 was the law relating to intestate succession which regulates the succession of properties of all Hindus by its heading itself which speaks of "devolution" of interest. It was held that "Devolve" means to pass from a person dying to a person living. Hence, the right of a daughter to be treated like a son should be construed only with regard to the share that "devolves" on her when her right to succession opens having regard to the scope and ambit of the Act itself. Hence the judgment in the case of Ms. R. Kanta shows the restrictive operation of Section 6 as applying to devolution of interest upon the death of coparcener only.


Bench consisting of JUSTICE R.V. Raveendran, JUSTICE A.K. Patnaik, JUSTICE H.L. Gokhale in their Judgment in case of Suraj Lamp  Industries (P) ... vs State Of Haryana & Anr. Decided on 11 October, 2011


1. Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt.Ltd. vs. State of Haryana & Anr. - 2009 (7) SCC 363 noted the ill-effects of such SA/GPA/WILL transactions (that is generation of black money, growth of land mafia and criminalization of civil disputes.

2. Recourse to `SA/GPA/WILL' transactions is taken in regard to freehold properties, even when there is no bar or prohibition regarding transfer or conveyance of such property, by Vendors with imperfect title who cannot or do not want to execute registered deeds of conveyance.

3. Recourse to `SA/GPA/WILL' transactions is taken in regard to freehold properties, even when there is no bar or prohibition regarding transfer or conveyance of such property, by Purchasers who want to invest undisclosed wealth/income in immovable properties without any public record of the transactions. The process enables them to hold any number of properties without disclosing them as assets held.

4. Recourse to `SA/GPA/WILL' transactions is taken in regard to freehold properties, even when there is no bar or prohibition regarding transfer or conveyance of such property, by Purchasers who want to avoid the payment of stamp duty and registration charges either deliberately or on wrong advice. Persons who deal in real estate resort to these methods to avoid multiple stamp duties/registration fees so as to increase their profit margin. Whatever be the intention, the consequences are disturbing and far reaching, adversely affecting the economy, civil society and law and order. Firstly, it enables large scale evasion of income tax, wealth tax, stamp duty and registration fees thereby denying the benefit of such revenue to the government and the public. Secondly, such transactions enable persons with undisclosed wealth/income to invest their black money and also earn profit/income, thereby encouraging circulation of black money and corruption.

5. When the market value increases, many vendors (who effected power of attorney sales without registration) are tempted to resell the property taking advantage of the fact that there is no registered instrument or record in any public office thereby cheating the purchaser. When the purchaser under such `power of attorney sales' comes to know about the vendors action, he invariably tries to take the help of musclemen to `sort out' the issue and protect his rights. On the other hand, real estate mafia many a time purchase properties which are already subject to power of attorney sale and then threaten the previous `Power of Attorney Sale' purchasers from asserting their rights. Either way, such power of attorney sales indirectly lead to growth of real estate mafia and criminalization of real estate transactions.

6. It also makes title verification and certification of title, which is an integral part of orderly conduct of transactions relating to immovable property, difficult, if not impossible, giving nightmares to bonafide purchasers wanting to own a property with an assurance of good and marketable title.


1. We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of `GPA sales' or `SA/GPA/WILL transfers' do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immoveable property.

2. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of section 53A of the TP Act.

3. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations in Municipal or Revenue Records.

4. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered Assignment of Lease.

5. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/WILL transactions known as GPA sales.


It has been submitted that making declaration that GPA sales and SA/GPA/WILL transfers are not legally valid modes of transfer is likely to create hardship to a large number of persons who have entered into such transactions and they should be given sufficient time to regularize the transactions by obtaining deeds of conveyance. It is also submitted that this decision should be made applicable prospectively to avoid hardship.


1. We have merely drawn attention to and reiterated the well-settled legal position that SA/GPA/WILL transactions are not `transfers' or `sales' and that such transactions cannot be treated as completed transfers or conveyances. They can continue to be treated as existing agreement of sale. Nothing prevents affected parties from getting registered Deeds of Conveyance to complete their title. The said `SA/GPA/WILL transactions' may also be used to obtain specific performance or to defend possession under section 53A of TP Act. If they are entered before this day, they may be relied upon to apply for regularization of allotments/leases by Development Authorities.

2. We make it clear that if the documents relating to `SA/GPA/WILL transactions' has been accepted acted upon by DDA or other developmental authorities or by the Municipal or revenue authorities to effect mutation, they need not be disturbed, merely on account of this decision.

3. We make it clear that our observations are not intended to in any way affect the validity of sale agreements and powers of attorney executed in genuine transactions. For example, a person may give a power of attorney to his spouse, son, daughter, brother, sister or a relative to manage his affairs or to execute a deed of conveyance.

4. A person may enter into a development agreement with a land developer or builder for developing the land either by forming plots or by constructing apartment buildings and in that behalf execute an agreement of sale and grant a Power of Attorney empowering the developer to execute agreements of sale or conveyances in regard to individual plots of land or undivided shares in the land relating to apartments in favour of prospective purchasers. In several States, the execution of such development agreements and powers of attorney are already regulated by law and subjected to specific stamp duty. Our observations regarding `SA/GPA/WILL transactions' are not intended to apply to such bonafide/genuine transactions.


1. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 transfer of property means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself and one or more other living persons; and to transfer property ; is to perform such act.

2. Section 54 of the TP Act defines `sales' thus: Sale is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised.

3. Sale how made. Such transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument.

4. In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property.

5. Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property.

6. A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.

7. Section 53A of the TP Act defines `part performance' - Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract : Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance.

8. Section 27 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 casts upon the party, liable to pay stamp duty, an obligation to set forth in the instrument all facts and circumstances which affect the chargeability of duty on that instrument. Article 23 prescribes stamp duty on `Conveyance'. In many States appropriate amendments have been made whereby agreements of sale acknowledging delivery of possession or power of Attorney authorizes the attorney to `sell any immovable property are charged with the same duty as leviable on conveyance.

9. Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 which makes a deed of conveyance compulsorily registrable. We extract below the relevant portions of section 17 Section 17 - Documents of which registration is compulsory- (1) The following documents shall be registered, namely:--… (b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property……. (1A) The documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) shall be registered if they have been executed on or after the commencement of the Registration and Other Related laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 and if such documents are not registered on or after such commencement, then, they shall have no effect for the purposes of the said section 53A.

10. The Registration Act, 1908, was enacted with the intention of providing orderliness, discipline and public notice in regard to transactions relating to immovable property and protection from fraud and forgery of documents of transfer. This is achieved by requiring compulsory registration of certain types of documents and providing for consequences of non-registration.

11. Section 49 of the said Act (Registration Act, 1908) provides that no document required by Section 17 to be registered shall, affect any immovable property comprised therein or received as evidence of any transaction affected such property, unless it has been registered. Registration of a document gives notice to the world that such a document has been executed.

12. Registration provides safety and security to transactions relating to immovable property, even if the document is lost or destroyed. It gives publicity and public exposure to documents thereby preventing forgeries and frauds in regard to transactions and execution of documents. Registration provides information to people who may deal with a property, as to the nature and extent of the rights which persons may have, affecting that property.

13. In other words, it enables people to find out whether any particular property with which they are concerned, has been subjected to any legal obligation or liability and who is or are the person/s presently having right, title, and interest in the property. It gives solemnity of form and perpetuate documents which are of legal importance or relevance by recording them, where people may see the record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars are and as far as land is concerned what obligations exist with regard to them. It ensures that every person dealing with immovable property can rely with confidence upon the statements contained in the registers (maintained under the said Act) as a full and complete account of all transactions by which the title to the property may be affected and secure extracts/copies duly certified.

14. Registration of documents makes the process of verification and certification of title easier and simpler. It reduces disputes and litigations to a large extent.

15. Section 54 of TP Act makes it clear that a contract of sale, that is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.

16. A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognised in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal obligation created by a contract of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein." In India, the word `transfer' is defined with reference to the word `convey'. The word `conveys' in section 5 of Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying ownership... ...that only on execution of conveyance ownership passes from one party to another....

17. In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra [2004 (8) SCC 614] this Court held: Protection provided under Section 53A of the Act to the proposed transferee is a shield only against the transferor. It disentitles the transferor from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferee who is put in possession in pursuance to such an agreement. It has nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who remains full owner of the property till it is legally conveyed by executing a registered sale deed in favour of the transferee. Such a right to protect possession against the proposed vendor cannot be pressed in service against a third party. It is thus clear that a transfer of immoveable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immoveable property can be transferred. 

18. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of sections 54 and 55 of TP Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted under section 53A of TP Act). According to TP Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of TP Act enacts that sale of immoveable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not create any interest or charge on its subject matter.

19. A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable property. The power of attorney is A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable property. The power of attorney is creation of an agency whereby the grantor authorizes the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when executed will be binding on the grantor as if done by him (see section 1A and section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882). It is revocable or terminable at any time unless it is made irrevocable in a manner known to law. Even an irrevocable attorney does not have the effect of transferring title to the grantee. Creation of an agency whereby the grantor authorizes the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when executed will be binding on the grantor as if done by him (see section 1A and section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882). It is revocable or terminable at any time unless it is made irrevocable in a manner known to law. Even an irrevocable attorney does not have the effect of transferring title to the grantee.

20. An attorney holder may however execute a deed of conveyance in exercise of the power granted under the power of attorney and convey title on behalf of the grantor.

21. A will is the testament of the testator. It is a posthumous disposition of the estate of the testator directing distribution of his estate upon his death. It is not a transfer inter vivos. The two essential characteristics of a will are that it is intended to come into effect only after the death of the testator and is revocable at any time during the life time of the testator. It is said that so long as the testator is alive, a will is not be worth the paper on which it is written, as the testator can at any time revoke it. If the testator, who is not married, marries after making the will, by operation of law, the will stands revoked. (see sections 69 and 70 of Indian Succession Act, 1925). Registration of a will does not make it any more effective.


The Hon'ble Apex Court has consistently held that the Court should not pass an interim order which amounts to a final relief. Whether the petitioner is entitled for any relief has to be adjudicated upon at the time of final disposal of the writ petition. The Court should not pass an interim order without considering the issues of public interest, balance of convenience, as to whether prima facie case is made out; as to whether the party concerned could be compensated in terms of money etc., and other relevant considerations. 

Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 330; 
State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties and Anr., AIR 1985 SC 1289; 
A.P. Christians Medical Educational Society v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1986 SC 1490; State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Mohd. Yakoob Khan and Ors., (1992) 4 SCC 167; U.P. Junior Doctors Action Committee and Ors. v. Dr. B. Shitat Nandwani, AIR 1992 SC 671; 
Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kumar Bansal and Anr., AIR 1993 SC 2412; 
St. John's Teachers Training Institute (for Women) and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., (1993) 3 SCC 595; 
Dr. B.S. Kshirsagar v. Abdul Khalik Mohd. Musa, 1995 Suppl (2) SCC 593; 
Bank of Maharashtra v. Race Shipping and Transport Co. (P) Ltd., AIR 1995 SC 1368; 
Commissioner/Secretary, Government of Health and Medical Education Department v. Dr. Ashok Kumar Kohli, 1995 Suppl (4) SCC 214; 
Shiv Shankar and Ors. v. Board of Directors, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Ors., 1995 Supp (2) SCC 726 ; 
Union of India v. Shree Ganesh Steel Rolling Mills Ltd., (1996) 8 SCC 347; 
State of Madhya Pradesh v. M.V. Vyavsaya and Co., AIR 1997 SC 993; 
Central Board of Secondary Education v. P. Sunil Kumar, (1998) 5 SCC 377;  
Stale of U.P. and Ors. v. Ram Sukhi Devi, 2004 AIR SCW 6955


Justice P. Sathasivam, Justice B.S. Chauhan of Supreme Court of India in M/S Thermax Ltd.& Ors. vs K.M.Johny & Ors. on 27 September, 2011 The injury alleged may form the basis of civil claim and may also constitute the ingredients of some crime punishable under criminal law. When there is dispute between the parties arising out of a transaction involving passing of valuable properties between them, the aggrieved person may have a right to sue for damages or compensation and at the same time, law permits the victim to proceed against the wrongdoer for having committed an offence of criminal breach of trust or cheating. Here the main offence alleged by the appellant is that the respondents committed the offence under Section 420 IPC and the case of the appellant is that the respondents have cheated him and thereby dishonestly induced him to deliver property. To deceive is to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false and which the person practising the deceit knows or believes to be false. It must also be shown that there existed a fraudulent and dishonest intention at the time of commission of the offence.


Supreme Court of India, State Of Haryana vs Mukesh Kumar & Ors. on 30 September, 2011, Bench: JUSTICE Dalveer Bhandari, and JUSTICE Deepak Verma, observed “The Government should protect the property of a citizen - not steal it. And yet, as the law currently stands, they may do just that. If this law is to be retained, according to the wisdom of the Parliament, then at least the law must require those who adversely possess land to compensate title owners according to the prevalent market rate of the land or property in question. This alternative would provide some semblance of justice to those who have done nothing other than sitting on their rights for the statutory period, while allowing the adverse possessor to remain on property. …. The archaic law of adverse possession is one such. A serious re-look is absolutely imperative in the larger interest of the people………….. Adverse possession allows a trespasser - a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, in the eyes of law - to gain legal title to land which he has illegally possessed for 12 years. How 12 years of illegality can suddenly be converted to legal title is, logically and morally speaking, baffling. This outmoded law essentially asks the judiciary to place its stamp of approval upon conduct that the ordinary Indian citizen would find reprehensible. ………….. The doctrine of adverse possession has troubled a great many legal minds. We are clearly of the opinion that time has come for change……… If the protectors of law become the grabbers of the property (land and building), then, people will be left with no protection and there would be a total anarchy in the entire country.”


Justice R V Raveendran and Justice Markandey Katju Janak Dulari Devi v. Kapildeo Rai, (2011) Normally, ownership and title to the property will pass to the purchaser on registration of the sale deed with effect from the date of execution of the sale deed. But this is not an invariable rule, as the true test of passing of property is the intention of parties. Though registration is prima facie proof of an intention to transfer the property, it is not proof of operative transfer if payment of consideration (price) is a condition precedent for passing of the property.



JUSTICE Venkatachalliah, M.N. In STATE OF U.P. v. DHARMANDER PRASAD SINGH 1989 AIR 997, 1989 SCR (1) 176 while dealing with the rights of the State Government on cancellation of a lease granted by it, the Supreme Court held that the fact that the lessor is the state does not place it in any higher pedestal or better position. The Supreme Court observed thus: "Under law, the possession of a Lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited.... ...... Therefore, there is no question in the present case of the government thinking of appropriating to itself an extrajudicial right of re-entry. Possession can be resumed by Government only in a manner known to or recognised by law. It can resume possession otherwise than in accordance with law. Government is accordingly prohibited from taking possession otherwise than in due course of law."

JUSTICE K Singh, and JUSTICE M Kania, In KRISHNA RAM MAHALE v. SHOBHA VENKAT RAO AIR 1989 SC 2097, while considering the claim of a licence, who has been wrongly dispossessed by the licenser before the expiry of licence period, for restoration of possession, the Supreme Court observed thus: "It is well settled law in this Country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse of law." The Supreme Court held that the dispossessed licence was entitled to restoration of possession in spite of the fact that by then the term of licence has expired.

JUSTICE S.S.Ahmad, JUSTICE D.P.Wadhwa. In STATE OF HARYANA v. MOHINDER PAL 2003(1) WLC (SC) Civil 499 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal filed against a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which had held that the Government cannot take law into its own hand while dispossessing persons in possession of land by putting up khokhas (on the ground that they were unauthorized occupants to Government land) but should have followed the due procedure prescribed by law. The Supreme court held that: ".... Question of examining the title of the parties does not arise at all as admittedly respondents were in possession of the property in question and put up structures thereon. On that admitted position, High Court took the view that ejectment of the respondents forcibly without due recourse of law was not in due process. No exception can be taken to that view at all. In fact, this view is consistent with what has been stated by this Court........"

JUSTICE M Venikatachaliah, and JUSTICE D V Rao, In PATIL EXHIBITORS PVT. LTD. v. BANGALORE CITY CORPORATION AIR 1986 Kant 194, ILR 1985 KAR 3700, 1985 (2) KarLJ 533 a Division Bench of Karnataka High Court observed thus: "It is part of the concept of "Rule of Law" that no claim to a right to dispossess by the use of force without recourse to procedure in accordance with law is recognized or countenanced by Courts. Such a right in the respondent cannot be recognised regardless of the question whether or not the appellant (Licencee) itself has any subsisting right to remain in possession. The protection that the Court affords is not of the possession which in the circumstances is litigious possession and cannot be equated with lawful possession but a protection against forcible dispossession. The basis of relief is a corollary of the principle that even with the best of title, there can be not forcible dispossession. .... Under our jurisprudence, even an unauthorized occupant can be evicted only in the manner authorized by law. This is the essence of the Rule of law."

Hegde, K.S. SIKRI, S.M. SHELAT, J.M. In MUNSHI RAM v. DELHI ADMINISTRATION 1968 AIR 702, 1968 SCR (2) 408 the Supreme Court succinctly stated the legal possession regarding settled possession thus; "It is true that no one including the true owner has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted endue course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. But, stray or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitle to defend against the rightful owner much be a settled possession extending over a sufficiently long period and acquiesced in by the true owner. A casual act of possession would not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. The rightful owner may re-enter and reinstate himself provided he does not use more force than necessary, such entry will be viewed only as a resistance to an intrusion upon possession which has never been lost. The persons in possession by a stray act of trespass, a possession which has not matured into settled possession, constitute an unlawful assembly, giving right to the true owner, though not in actual possession at the time to remove the obstruction even by using necessary force."

FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA, BHAGWATI, P.N., KRISHNAIYER, V.R. Supreme Court in RAM RATTAN v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 1977 AIR 619, 1977 SCR (2) 232 as follows: "..... It is well settled that a true owner has every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser, while the trespasser is in the act or prices of trespassing, and has not accomplished his possession, but this right is not available to the true owner if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner. In such circumstances, the law requires that the owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies available under the law..... it may not be possible to laydown a rule of universal application as to when the possession of a trespasser becomes complete and accomplished"

V. Gopala Gowda, J. D. Narayanappa vs The State Of Karnataka, ILR 2005 KAR 295, Having regard to the principles laid down in the above said decisions, we may conveniently cull out the legal position in regard to a true owner vis-a-vis a trespasser as under.
i) A true owner (even if it is the State or a Statutory body) has no right to forcibly dispossess an unauthorized occupant (including a trespasser) in settled possession, otherwise than in accordance with law.
ii) A trespasser or unauthorized occupant in settled possession can be dispossessed, only in accordance with an order/decree of a competent Court/tribunal/authority or by exercise of any statutory power of dispossession/demolition entrusted to the State or statutory Authority.
iii) A person in unauthorized possession shall be deemed to be in settled possession, if his entry into the property was lawful or authorized.
iv) a person in unauthorized possession, whose entry into the property is illegal or unauthorized, can claim to be unsettled possession, only if he is in open, continuous and actual physical possession over a sufficiently long period, with the knowledge of the true owner.
v) A surreptitious and unauthorized entry into another's land and stealthy trespasser, will not have the effect of dispossessing the true owner of giving possession to the trespasser. Such acts will lead to settled possession only when the true owner having knowledge of it, acquiesces in it.
vi) Where the trespasser is not in settled possession, all acts of the trespasser in regard to the property will be considered as only attempts to secure possession. The true and rightful owner can re-enter and reinstate himself by removing the obstruction or the unauthorized construction put up by the trespasser by using the minimum force. Such action by the true owner will be considered as defending his possession and resisting an intrusion with his property and not forcible dispossession of an unauthorized occupant.
vii) Where however the trespasser is in settled possession and such settled possession adverse to the true owner continues for 12 years, the right of the true owner is extinguished and the trespasser as possessory owner acquires absolute title to the property in question."