In the case of Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad and Ors. v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad (dead) through LRs and Ors. (2005) 11 SCC 314 , it is categorically held by the Apex Court after discussion of following decisions that judicial admissions by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties and admissions in the pleadings are admissible proprio vigore against the makers thereof. In Nagindas Ramdas Vs. Dalpatram Iccharam alias Brijram and others [AIR 1974 SC 471], this Court held: "Admissions if true and clear are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admission. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the rival as evidence are by themselves not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong." In Viswalakshmi Sasidharan (Mrs.) and Others Vs. Branch Manager, Syndicate Bank, Belgaum [(1997) 10 SCC 173], this Court held: "On the other hand, it is admitted that due to slump in the market they could not sell the goods, realize the price of the finished product and pay back the loan to the Bank. That admission stands in their way to plead at the later stage that they suffered loss on account of the deficiency in service..." In Kaveripatnam Subbaraya Setty Annaiah Setty Charities Trust Vs. S.K. Viswanatha Setty [(2004) 8 SCC 717], this Court deprecated raising a plea for the first time before the appellate court without amendment of plaint holding that when materials to substantiate such plea had not been brought on record and, thus, it is impermissible to consider the same, stating:"However, there is no material placed on record by way of pleadings to show whether the appellant is a religious or charitable institution. The plaint was never amended. The appellant seeks exemption. Exemption needs to be alleged and proved. Opportunity is required to be given to the respondent to meet the plea of exemption. In the circumstances, we are in agreement with the view expressed by the High Court that the said plea was not open to the appellant at the stage of second appeal, particularly, in the absence of any material available to substantiate such plea." In Heeralal Vs. Kalyan Mal and Others [(1998) 1 SCC 278] following Modi Spinning (supra), it was observed:"The facts of the present case are entirely different and consequently the said decision also cannot be of any help for the learned counsel for the respondents. Even that apart the said decision of two learned Judges of this Court runs counter to a decision of a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in the case of Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram and Co., (1977) 1 SCR 728 : (AIR 1977 SC 680). In that case Ray, C.J., speaking for the Bench had to consider the question whether the defendant can be allowed to amend his written statement by taking an inconsistent plea as compared to the earlier plea which contained an admission in favour of the plaintiff. It was held that such an inconsistent plea which would displace the plaintiff completely from the admissions made by the defendants in the written statement cannot be allowed. If such amendments are allowed in the written statement plaintiff will be irretrievably prejudiced by being denied the opportunity of extracting the admissions from the defendants."
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- CASE LAW ON GIFT OF ANCESTRAL PROPERTY BY KARTA
- SALE OF MINOR PROPERTY COURT PERMISSION NEEDED
- CASE LAW ON JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
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- CONDONING THE DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL
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1993 (4) SCC 38,: - The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,
1956: Section 8--Intent of--Whether protects the property of a minor from the
depredations of the parents even. Words and Phrases--Voidable and Void--
The mother of the respondent minors, acting as their guardian, sold their land, while they were still minors, to the appellant under a registered sale deed dated July 30,1964. The respondents, upon attaining majority, sued the appellant for possession of the said land on the ground that the sale thereof, having been made without the permission of the court, was void. The appellant in his written statement and at the time of hearing of the suit contended that the sale deed had been attested by the father of the respondents and the sale should, therefore, he deemed to have been a sale by the legal guardian of the respondents. It was also pleaded that the sale had been for legal necessity and the benefit of the respondents. It was also alleged that the suit was barred by limitation because the sale was voidable and not void and the suit had not been brought within three years of each of the respondents attaining majority. The trial court framed appropriate issues and came to the conclusion that it had not been proved that the sale was for legal necessity or for the benefit of the respondents, that the sale by the respondent's mother without the permission of the court was void, and the sale was void and not voidable and the suit was, therefore, in time and was decreed. The appeal filed by the appellant before the Additional Distt. Judge and the High Court failed. The appellant, therefore, preferred this appeal by special leave. Dismissing the appeal, this court,
1. The provisions of section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 are devised to fully protect the property (.if a minor, even from the depredations of his parents. Section 8 empowers only the legal guardian to alienate a minor's immovable property provided it is for the necessity or benefit of the minor or his estate and it further requires that such alienation shall be effected after the permission of the Court has been obtained."
2. It was difficult, therefore, to hold that the sale, by reason of the fact that the mother of the minor respondents signed the sale deed and the father attested it, was voidable, not void.
3. The attestation of the sale deed by the father showed that he was very much existent and in the picture. If he was, then the sale by the mother, notwithstanding the fact that the father attested it, cannot he held to be sale by the father and natural guardian satisfying the requirements of section 8.
Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre vs. Pathankhan and ors., AIR 1971 S.C. 315. This was a case in which it was held that the position in Hindu law was that when the father was alive he was the natural guardian and it was only after him that the mother became the natural guardian. Where the father was alive but had fallen out with the mother of the minor child and was living separately for several years without taking any interest in the affairs of the minor, who was in the keeping and care of the mother, it was held that, in the peculiar circumstances, the father should be treated as if nonexistent and, therefore, the mother could be considered as the natural guardian of the minor's person as well as property, having power to bind the minor by dealing with her immovable property.
Supreme Court in Ammathayee alias Perumalakkal and Another V. Kumaresan alias Balakrishnan and Others AIR 1967 SC 569 summarised the Hindu Law on the question of gifts of ancestral properties in the following words: Hindu law on the question of gifts of ancestral property is well settled. So far as moveable ancestral property is concerned, a gift out of affection may be made to a wife, to a daughter and even to a son, provided the gift is within reasonable limits. A gift for example of the whole or almost the whole of the ancestral moveable property cannot be upheld as a gift through affection.
But so far as immovable ancestral property is concerned, the power of gift is much more circumscribed than in the case of moveable ancestral property. A Hindu father or any other managing member has power to make a gift of ancestral immovable property within reasonable limits for pious purposes; Now what is generally understood by pious purposes is gift for charitable and/or religious purposes. But this Court has extended the meaning of pious purposes to cases where a Hindu father makes a gift within reasonable limits of immovable ancestral property to his daughter in fulfilment of an antenuptial promise made on the occasion of the settlement of the terms of her marriage, and the same can also be done by the mother in case the father is dead.
AIR 2000 SC 3529 THIMMAIAH VS NINGAMMA The Karta is competent or has the power to dispose of coparcenary property only if (a) the disposition is of a reasonable portion of the coparcenary property and (b) the disposition is for a recognised pious purpose.
This Court in Guramma V. Mallappa AIR 1964 SC 510 has envisaged three situations of voidable transactions. It was held that a managing member may alienate joint family property in three situations namely: (i) legal necessity, or (ii) benefit of the estate or (iii) with the consent of all the coparceners of the family. Where the alienation is not with the consent of all the coparceners, it is voidable at the instance of the coparcener whose consent has not been obtained.
In this connection, a reference may be made in the case of State Bank of India Vs. Ghamandi Ram reported in AIR 1969 SC 1333, it was held thus:- "According to the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law all the property of a Hindu Joint Family is held in collective ownership by all the coparceners in the quasi-corporate copacity. The textual authority of the Mitakshara Lays down in express terms that the joint famil;y property is held in trust from the joint family members then living and thereafter to be both. The incidents of coparcernership under the Mitakshara Law are: first the lineal male descendants of a person upto the third generation, acquire on birth ownership in the ancestral properties of such person; Secondly that such descendants can at any time work out their rights by asking for partition; thirdly, that till partition each member has got ownership extending over the entire property co- jointly with the rest; forthly, that as a result of such co-ownership the possession and enjoyment of the properties is common fifthly that no alienation of the property is possible unless it before necessity, without the concurrence of the coparceners, and sixthly; that the interest of a deceased member lapses on his death to the survivors. A coparcenary under the Mitakshara School is a creature of law and cannot arise by act of parties except in so far that on adoption the adopted son becomes a co-parcener with his adoptive father as regards the ancestral properties of the letter."
The concept of coparcener as given in the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law as already mentioned above, is that of a joint family property wherein all the members of the coparceners share equally. In this connection a reference may be made to a decision of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh & Ors. reported in (1985) 2 SCC 321 in which Their Lordships have held as follows: " A Hindu coparcenary is however, a narrower body than the joint family. Only males who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property can be members of the coparcenary or coparceners. A male member of a joint family and his sons, grandsons and great grandsons constitute a coparcenary. A coparcener acquires right in the coparcenary property by birth but his right can be definitely ascertained only when a partition takes place. When the family is joint, the extent of the share of a coparcener cannot be definitely predicated since it is always capable of fluctuating."
In N.R. Raghavachariar's Hindu Law Principles and precedents " 8th Edition (1987) at page 230 under the heading 'Rights of Coparceners' it is said thus:- "The following are the rights of a coparcener :- (1) Right by birth (2) Right by survivorship, (3) Right to partition, (4) Right to joint possession and enjoyment, (5) Right to restrain unauthorized acts (6) Right of alienation, (7) Right to accounts and (8) Right to make self-acquisition".
Likewise, S.V. Gupta, author of Hindu Law, Vol. 1, Third Edition (1981) at page 162, the learned author deals with the rights of a coparcener. He says thus:- "Until partition, coparcener is entitled to:- (1) join possession and enjoyment of joint family property (2) the right to take the joint family property by survivorship, and (3) the right to demand partition of the joint family property"
The position in Hindu law is that whereas the father has the power to gift ancestral movables within reasonable limits, he has no such power with regard to the ancestral immovable property or coparcenary property. He can, however make a gift within reasonable limits of ancestral immovable property for "pious purposes". However, the alienation must be by an act inter vivos, and not by will. This Court has extended the rule and held that the father was competent to make a gift of immovable property to a daughter, if the gift is of reasonable extent having regard to the properties held by the family.
This Court considered the question of extended meaning given in numerous decisions for "pious purposes" in Kamla Devi vs. Bachulal Gupta [ 1957 SCR 452]. In the said case a Hindu widow in fulfilment of an ante-nuptial promise made on the occasion of the settlement of the terms of marriage of her daughter, executed a registered deed of gift in respect of 4 houses allotted to her share in a partition decree, in favour of her daughter as her marriage dowry, after two years of her marriage. The partition decree had given her the right to the income from property but she had no right to part with the corpus of the property to the prejudice of the reversioners. Her step sons brought a suit for declaration that the deed of gift was void and inoperative and could not bind the reversioners. The trial court and the High Court dismissed the suit holding that the gift was not valid. This Court accepted the appeal and held that the gift made in favour of the daughter was valid in law and binding on the reversioners. This point was again examined in depth by this Court in Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh and another vs. Malappa 1964 (4) SCR 497 and it was held:- "The legal position may be summarized thus: The Hindu law texts conferred a right upon a daughter or a sister, as the case may be, to have a share in the family property at the time of partition. That right was lost by efflux of time. But it became crystallized into a moral obligation. The father or his representative can make a valid gift, by way of reasonable provision for the maintenance of the daughter, regard being had to the financial and other relevant circumstances of the family. By custom or by convenience, such gifts are made at the time of marriage, but the right of the father or his representative to make such a gift is not confined to the marriage occasion. It is a moral obligation and it continues to subsist till it is discharged. Marriage is only a customary occasion for such a gift. But the obligation can be discharged at any time, either during the lifetime of the father or thereafter. It is not possible to lay down a hard and fast rule, prescribing the quantitative limits of such a gift as that would depend on the facts of each case and it can only be decided by Courts, regard being had to the overall picture of the extent of the family estate, the number of daughters to be provided for and other paramount charges and other similar circumstances. If the father is within his rights to make a gift of a reasonable extent of the family property for the maintenance of a daughter, it cannot be said that the said gift must be made only by one document or only at a single point of time. The validity or the reasonableness of a gift does not depend upon the plurality of documents but on the power of the father to make a gift and the reasonableness of the gift so made. If once the power is granted and the reasonableness of the gift is not disputed, the fact that two gift deeds were executed instead of one, cannot make the gift anytheless a valid one."
In M.V.S. Manikayala Rao vs. M. Narasimhaswami & Ors. [(AIR 1966 SC 470], this Court held: "Now, it is well settled that the purchaser of a coparcener's undivided interest in joint family property is not entitled to possession of what he has purchased. His only right is to sue for partition of the property and ask for allotment to him of that which on partition might be found to fall to the share of the coparcener whose share he had purchased."
Bharat Singh & Anr. vs. Bhagirathi [(1966) 1 SCR 606], wherein this Court held: "Admissions have to be clear if they are to be used against the person making them. Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of ss. 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. We are of opinion that the admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions."
In Pratap Rai Tanwani Vs. Uttam Chand (2004 (8) SCC 490), Supreme Court held that subsequent developments can be taken into consideration to afford relief to the parties, provided only when such developments had a material impact on those rights and obligations.
In Ramesh Kumar Vs. Kesho Ram [1992 Supp. (2) SCC 623 where Supreme Court observed as follows : - "The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a `cautious cognizance of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief."