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CASE LAW ON KARNATAKA LAND REFORMS ACT AND TRANSFERS



Under Section 61 of Karnataka Land Reforms act 1961. Occupancy granted to the tenant by the final order of the tribunal cannot be transferred by the occupant for 15 years from the date of final order. The land can be partitioned among the family, can be bequeathed by will, but it cannot be Sold, Gifted, Exchanged, Mortgaged, Leased or assigned.


A CASE BEFORE FULL BENCH OF HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA WAS DECIDED BY HON’BLE JUSTICES N.K. JAIN, H. RANGAVITTALACHAR AND V.G, SABHAHIT, HAS PASSED A LAND MARK JUDGEMENT RELATED TO TENANTED LANDS AND PTCL ACT. In Mohammed Jaffar and Another V State of Karnataka and Others, Reported in 2003(1) Kar. L.J. 337 (FB).

1. Tenanted land that stood vested in State Government as on 1-3-1974 under Land Reforms Act, does not become "granted land" when occupancy in respect of such land is conferred on tenant, merely because tenant happens to be person belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe — Vesting of tenanted land in State Government is not absolute but is subject to vested right of tenant to get occupancy conferred on him — Conferment of occupancy right on tenant by Land Tribunal does not amount to making grant of land — Alienation of land in respect of which occupancy was conferred on erstwhile tenant, held, is not hit by prohibitions contained in Act of 1978.

2. A bare reading of Section 3(l)(b) of the PTCL Act makes it clear that the land should be granted by the Government and such land is to be granted to a person belonging to Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes under the relevant law including agrarian reforms. Once the land is held to be a granted land, the restriction contained in Section 4 regarding the apprehension of transfer of land would apply. . . . Section 44 of the KLR Act deals with vesting of the land in the Government. Therefore, the land which is not granted by the State Government cannot prima facie be hit by the provisions of the PTCL Act.

3. All the lands held by or in possession of the tenants vest with the State Government free from all encumbrances and the State Government is entitled to take possession of the said properties. However, as per Section 44(e) the Government is not entitled to take possession of the tenanted land and the permanent tenants, protected tenants and other tenants holding the land are entitled to such right or privileges and subject to such conditions provided under Act. In view of Section 44 of the KLR Act, it is clear that conferment of occupancy right by the Land Tribunal, and not by the Government, is only a declaration or pre-existing right which has been conferred on the tenant under Section 45 and vesting of the land is subject to right that is conferred on the tenant for conferment of occupancy right- Section 45 of the KLR Act gives a right to a person who is a tenant on the land to get the occupancy right conferred in his favour and Sections 48 and 48-A deals with the constitution of the Tribunals and enquiry by the Tribunal. The occupancy right will be conferred by the Land Tribunal and not by the Government under Section 48-A of the KLR Act on a tenant who was cultivating the land personally on 1-3-1974. Therefore, what is conferred on the tenant who was personally cultivating the land on 1-3-1974 is the declaration of his occupancy right of land on 1-3-1974, by the Tribunal. The preamble to the KLR Act clearly shows that the Act is enacted to confer ownership on the tenants and wherefore, it is clear that the conferment of occupancy right on the tenant who was personally cultivating the land on 1-3-1974 is conferment of ownership on the tenant as per the preamble to the Act and the same is subject to certain restrictions which are imposed in the certificate of registration issued under Section 55 of the Act in Form 10.

4. Conferment of occupancy right is only declaration of the fact that the tenant who was personally cultivating the land on 1-3-1974 and the land which has vested with the Government, the tenant js declared as the occupant of the said land subject to the restrictions contained in the certificate of registration and if the tenant proves that he has been personally cultivating the land on 1-3-1974 he cannot be denied conferment of occupancy right. .... Under the circumstances, it is clear that occupancy right cannot at all fall within the ambit of 'granted land' as defined under the PTCL Act. The vesting of land in the Government is subject to vested right of a tenant to get occupancy right and for determination of right and conferment of occupancy by Land Tribunal, a Statutory Authority established under the Land Reforms Act, is the Competent Authority to determine the same on a tenant who was personally cultivating the land on 1-3-1974.

5. In view of this, the occupancy right, which has been granted by the Land Tribunal, cannot be construed as "granted land" as defined under the PTCL Act. The land in respect of which the occupancy right has conferred under Section 48-A of the KLR Act would not fall within the ambit of 'granted land' as defined under Section 3(1 }(b) of the PTCL Act.






AGRICULTURAL LAND

It includes garden land and land capable of being used for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient thereto — Whether land in question is agricultural land or not is question of fact, and where that question has been decided by Tribunal on basis of evidence on record and spot inspection, its decision cannot be interfered with in writ petition. Section 2-A(18) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act defines "land" to mean the land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient thereto and includes garden land. The Tribunal is a fact finding authority. Since it has recorded the findings on appreciation of the evidence available on record, this Court in exercise of the power under accuseds 226 and 227 of the Constitution cannot re-appreciate the evidence and arrive at different findings. — Alban D'Souza v The Land Tribunal, Udupi and Others, ILR 1999 Kar. 243.

AGRICULTURAL LABOURER WITH OTHER AVOCATION TO AUGMENT HIS INCOME

Merely because an agricultural labourer, to augment his income for the maintenance of himself and his family, for some time runs a tea shop in a portion of the dwelling-house, cannot be a ground to deprive him of the right given to an agricultural labourer to register him as an owner of a dwelling-house located in a village, as provided under Section 38 of the Act. — Dhananjaya Viswesvaraya Hegde v fatti Kuppa Naika (Deceased) by L.Rs and Others, 2002(3) Kar. L.J. 233A.

PUNJA LANDS

Punja lands in Dakshina Kannada District are not agricultural lands as only thatched grass are grown in those lands naturally and such lands are not brought under cultivation. . . . Where punja land is brought under cultivation, it is not a bar on the parties to adduce evidence that such land is brought under cultivation for agricultural purpose. No such evidence is there in this case. — Subhakar and Others v The Land Tribunal, Karkala Taluk, Karkala and Others, 1999(4) Kar. LJ. 524 (DB).

Tenancy for non-agricultural purpose — Claim to occupancy — Where lease is for non-agricultural purpose, merely because portion of land leased is used by tenant for running poultry farm and for horticulture, such land cannot be held to be agricultural land — Claim for occupancy, held, is not sustainable. In the instant case, the land in dispute is described as "punja land" in the earliest lease deed of 1935. Now the said land is situated within the City Corporation limits of Mangalore Town. The dominant purpose for which the land was leased is clearly indicated in the said lease deed that it was for the purpose of construction of a house and for possession and enjoyment of the same. Even the subsequent rental agreement dated 28-12-1945 taken by the petitioner as a mortgagee of the mulageni rights from the mulagenidars also indicates that the purpose of the said lease is for residential use of the house constructed thereon on a monthly rent fixed for a period of 11 months. The petitioner described himself as a 'Salesman' in Form No. VII filed by him and even in the evidence given by him before the Land Tribunal, he has given the same occupation of him. The land in dispute is described as hillock area in the Commissioner's report. Mere existence of trees in the compound of house constructed on punja land does not convert the land into an agricultural land when the dominant purpose of the lease is found to be for non- agricultural use and when the petitioner was not found to be an agriculturist by the notified date. The subsequent use of some portion of the land as a poultry farm, for growing vegetables and for raising some fruit bearing trees after the notified date cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of ascertaining whether the lease of the said land was for agricultural purposes by the notified date. Since it is found that the dominant purpose of the lease was only for non-agricultural purposes, the Appellate Authority was justified in holding that the land in dispute was not an agricultural land by the notified date and that the petitioner was not the tenant of the land in dispute for agricultural use of land by the notified date. — Narayana Devadiga (Deceased) by L.Rs. v Smt. Sharada and Others, 2002(1) Kar. L.J. 581A.




REMAND TO TRIBUNAL FOR FRESH DECISION ON LAPSES

The Judge in a writ petition quashing the order must remit the case to the Tribunal for a fresh disposal after affording opportunity to the petitioner. The case should not be decided by the Judge on re-appreciation of the evidence. The definition of agricultural land includes land which is capable of being used for agricultural purposes and also a forest land. Hence land on which casurina is raised is capable of being used for agricultural purposes and even as forest land it is agricultural land within the definition, Raising of casurina trees which are not of spontaneous growth is cultivation within Section 2(10) of the Act. Byalappa v State of Karnataka and Others, AIR 1982 Kant. 79


ACTS SUB-SERVIENT TO CULTIVATION OF LAND

Petitioner made an application for grant of occupancy in land measuring 8 guntas in a Survey No. Chilly plants were raised in two guntas and the remaining extent of land was used as thrashing floor and for stacking hay. Land as defined in Section 2(18) means not only land which is used for raising crops, but also land which is used for purposes sub-servient to raising crops. Thrashing of crops can reasonably be regarded as being sub-servient to growing of crops. Likewise, stocking fodder for feeding bullocks maintained by an agriculturist for ploughing the land can also be regarded as sub-servient to cultivation of land. Thrashing of crops can also reasonably be regarded as improving agricultural produce. Hence, the land can be regarded as land cultivated for the purpose of Section 45. It is only if the applicant was cultivating the land as tenant, he would be entitled to be registered as occupant; if he was cultivating the land as mortgagee in possession, he would not be entitled to be registered. Gurubasappa v Land Tribunal, Hirekerur, 1980(1) Kar. LJ. Sh. N. 132.

TENANCY FOR NONAGRICULTURAL PURPOSE — CLAIM TO OCCUPANCY.

The Act does not apply to all kinds of lands- in the State and to all categories of tenants. If the relationship of landlord and tenant does not rest on agrarian relations, the tenant who is in possession of the land, even if the land is an agricultural land not avail himself of any benefit under the Act. The governing factor to bring the case within the fold of the Act will be the relationship of landlord and tenant based on agrarian relations. The tenancy must relate to agriculture in order to bring the relationship of landlord and tenant within the ambit of agrarian relations. In the district of Dakshina Kannada there was no classification of lands as agricultural and non-agricultural. When a lease is evidenced by a written document in which the object or purpose of the lease is stated, then the purpose of the lease as stated in the lease deed concludes the question whether the land demised is agricultural land and the lessee a tenant within the meaning of the Act, notwithstanding the fact the land demised is a nanja or bagayat land. Tenancies and leases of land to which the Land Reforms Act applies are also subject to the prohibitions and limitations prescribed under Section 108(O) of the T.P. Act. Hence, a lessee cannot take advantage of a wrong committed by him by using the land leased for a different purpose than for which it was leased out to claim the benefit under the Act. The lands were demised for specific non-agricultural purposes, the purposes being industries, business, trade, manufacturing, residential, cinema theatres and any other purposes. The, tenancy was by the English calender month, rent being payable on the 5th of the succeeding month. In case of default interest was payable on the arrears. The lessee was directed to pay all taxes relating to the lands and to deduct the same from the rent. The lessee could erect such machinery, effect improvements, Repairs and do new construction or re-construction of buildings etc. The lands were situated within the Mangalore Municipal Limits. The properties demised were four items of land measuring 3 acres 69 cents classified as bagayat consisting of one tiled old main house, one small tiled old out house, thatched cow shed and bath shed, two wells, 40 mango trees, 6 jack trees, 75 coconut trees and 50 cashew trees. The lessee ran a cashew factory therein. The holding was not an agricultural holding and the lessee was not entitled to conferment of occupancy rights under the Act. The lessee could not also be held to be a deemed tenant within Section 4 of the Act. The emphasis in Section 4 is on 'lawful cultivation' and not 'lawful possession'. If a person taking agricultural lands for purpose of industries, commerce etc., uses it for agricultural purposes, his possession of the land will be lawful, but cultivation would not be lawful, as it would offend Section 108(O) of T.P.Act. — Bhamy Panduranga Shenoy v B.H. Ravindra and Others, AIR 1980 NOC 115.



ENTRIES IN RTC AND AVERMENTS IN SALE DEED

Entries in record of rights raise presumption that what is stated therein is correct, but averments in sale deed have no such presumptive value and facts stated therein have to be proved to be believed — Court cannot disbelieve entries in record of rights in absence of evidence to rebut presumption arising there from and merely on basis of unproved averment in sale deed. Muniyappa v G. Hanumanihappa (Deceased) By L.R. and Others, 2003(2) Kar. LJ. 294.
PERSONAL CULTIVATION OF LAND OF WIFE BY HUSBAND

A husband cultivating personally land belonging to his wife would be an agriculturist within Section 2-A(3) of the Act. Such cultivation would amount to cultivation on his own account within Section 2-A(11). Where one member of the family gets cultivated land of the owner member of the family through hired labour under his own supervision, the said cultivation by such supervising member would fall within the definition of personal cultivation in Section 2-A(11). Such construction of Clause (11) of Section 2-A does not militate against the explanations to the clause. The three explanations had been added to mitigate hardship which would have otherwise resulted to certain persons if the explanations had not been added. In all the three cases, i.e.. cultivation of the land held by persons covered by Explanation I or by a joint family covered by Explanation II or by a company or association etc., covered by Explanation III, through hired labour under the supervision of an employee, would be considered on account of such persons, although if these explanations had not been added, such would not be the case. This however would not prove the converse, that is, if a member of the family as defined by clause (12) gets cultivated land belonging to his family member through hired labour under his supervision, such cultivation of the land would not be treated as cultivation by such supervising member on his own account. The above construction of clause (11) would not defeat the objects of Section 80. — State of Karnataka and Another v Vasudem R.P., 1976(2) Kar. L.J. 382.


CULTIVATE PERSONALLY

Petitioner was member of a joint family consisting of himself and four brothers and the pahani extracts showed that petitioner was cultivating the land as a tenant from 1964 upto date. Petitioner's application for grant of occupancy was rejected solely on the ground that he was employed as Secretary in a land mortgage Bank. Held: It was the duty of the Tribunal to examine whether petitioner answered the definition of 'agriculturist' who cultivated lands personally. Under Section 2(11) to 'cultivate personally' includes cultivation of the land by the labour of any member of one's family or even hired labour. Further the pahani entries are presumed to be true until they are replaced by some other entries. The order of rejection cannot hence be sustained. — Raniasingh H.R. v Nagesh Rao D, ILR 1977 Kar. 1350

WIFE CANNOT CLAIM TENANCY UNDER HUSBAND

A member of the family as defined in the Act cannot claim tenancy under another member of the same family and seek registration of occupancy. Thus, a husband or the wife, as the case may be, cannot claim tenancy right as against the other in respect of his or her land. — A. Jalajakshi D. Aiwa v Meenaxi Naik and Another, 1980(2) Kar. LJ. 60.



"HADI" LAND

Land used for collecting leaves from shrubs and plants grown thereon for manuring adjacent land used for agricultural purpose — Such land, in District of Dakshina Kannada, comes within definition of "land", as such land cannot be considered as land used for non-agricultural purposes — Grant of occupancy in respect of such "hadi" land along with occupancy in respect of adjacent agricultural land is to be held in order. Ramachandra Devastanam, Sawada v Subbanna Shetty and Others, ILR 1998 Kar. 1588.


LAND WITH BUILDING — IF AGRICULTURAL LAND.

While determining whether the premises should be regarded as agricultural or non-agricultural, one must look to the dominant characteristics of such premises. The mere fact that there are some plants and trees in the compound of a house will not render the premises an agricultural one. Like-wise the mere fact that in an agricultural land there is a house used as a farm house will not render such premises non-agricultural. Not one factor is decisive and the cumulative effect of all factors should be considered. Where the premises were situated within municipal limits, were assessed to municipal tax, the tenancy was monthly and not annual, that the rent was monthly and not annual and the tenant was not an agriculturist by profession, held, the conclusion that premises are non-agricultural cannot be said to be erroneous. — Vanajakshi v land Tribunal, Udupi and Another, 1979(1) Kar. LJ. 412 (DB).

HOUSE WITH LAND FARM HOUSE

Defendant took the house and land appurtenant on lease for 11 months for a consolidated rent. After the expiry of the lease, the plaintiff sued for eviction. The land measured more than four acres and there were some coconut plants on the land. The lessee was a student and not a farmer. There was nothing to show that the lessee was cultivating in the land appurtenant. On a reading of the lease deed, it was manifest that what was let out was the house along with the land appurtenant and it was a lease of a dwelling house. A farm house is a house constructed in the farm which is cultivated by the farmer to facilitate him in the better cultivation of the farm. Even if a few coconut trees or other trees are found around the house, that would not convert the residential house into a farm house nor the tenant into an agriculturist. Lakshmana Gowda v Dorris, J. Coates, 1983(1) Kar. LJ. Sh. N. 85.




DWELLING HOUSE OF AGRICULTUAL LABOURERS

Even if the land was converted for non-agricultural purposes, an agricultural labourer, who is residing in a dwelling-house located in a village, will not lose his right to be registered as an owner in respect of the said land. Section 38 of the Act confers power on the Tribunal to register an agricultural labourer, who ordinarily resides in a dwelling-house on a land not belonging to him situated in any village. The word 'land' referred to in Section 38 of the Act in the context and in the background of the purpose of Section 38 of the Act, should not be given a restricted meaning as an agricultural land as defined under Section 2(18) of the Act. Section 2(18) of the Act must be understood for the purpose of conferment of occupancy right. The object of Section 38 of the Act is to register an agricultural labourer as an owner thereof in respect of the house and the land appurtenant thereto. While the object of conferment of occupancy right on an agricultural tenant is to give occupancy right to a tiller of the land, the object of Section 38 of the Act is to register an agricultural labourer who is residing in a dwelling-house not belonging to him located in a village, as owner thereof. In that background, if Section 38 of the Act is understood the nature of the land as to whether it is an agricultural land or a non-agricultural land, will not make any difference. The only requirement to register a person as an owner of a dwelling-house located in a village, is that he should be an agricultural labourer. Dhananjaya Visweswara Hegde v Jatti Kuppa Naika (Deceased) by L.Rs and Others, 2002(3) Kar. LJ. 233.


CONVERTED LAND

Agricultural land — Converted to non-agricultural use — Lease of building constructed on such land — Whether agricultural lease or building lease — Claim for occupancy — Where land was converted as non-agricultural land prior to 1-3-1974, and building constructed thereon was leased on monthly rental basis, such land cannot be considered as agricultural land and Tribunal has no jurisdiction to grant occupancy right to tenant claiming same. In this case, the HRC Court has come to the conclusion that the dominant purpose of taking the property on lease was for residential purpose and not for agricultural purpose. The property also was converted to non-agricultural purpose. The rent also was fixed on monthly basis and it was taken only for two months. The crop grown in the remaining area is only a few fruit bearing trees in the compound. For the foregoing reasons, the argument that still it is an agricultural land and not a non-agricultural land, is liable to be rejected. K. Jathappa Rai v State of Karnataka and Others, 2000(4) Kar. LJ. 503.


Non-agricultural land does not come within purview of Act — Such land does not vest with State Government under Section 44 of Act — Land Tribunal has no jurisdiction to enquiry into claims for occupancy in respect of such land. If the land is not a land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purpose or purposes subservient thereto, having been alienated for non-agricultural purpose, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant Land Revenue Act, it cannot be a subject-matter of enquiry before the Land Tribunal as the Land Tribunal gets no jurisdiction to enquire into the claim for occupancy in respect of such lands. The land in question being a non-agricultural land as on 1-3-1974, is not a "land" as defined by Section 2-A(18) of the Act and therefore, it did not fall within the purview of the Act. It also did not vest in the State Government under Section 44 of the Act. Therefore the Land Tribunal did not get jurisdiction to enquire into the claim for occupancy. — Mallikarjun Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Hubli v State of Kamataka and Others, 1995(6) Kar. L.J. 46A.



LAND DOES NOT INCLUDE HOUSE-SITE

Land does not include house-site or land used exclusively for non-agricultural purposes and no occupancy right in respect of such land can be conferred on occupant thereof. Tenant has put forth his claim to tenancy with respect to the particular area of 24 cents as an independent land under his cultivation. But on his own showing this plot of 24 cents was not at all a cultivable land in that it was his dwelling premises exclusively in his possession and enjoyment as on the material date 1-3-1974. It is not his further case that this 24 cents of land was part and parcel of a single land under his cultivation as a tenant so as to characterize his said house as a farm house. The land in respect of which the person in occupation thereof is entitled to claim tenancy under the Act must be the "Land" within the meaning of the definition contained in sub-section (18) of Section 2-A of the Act A plain reading of the definition of the land contained in Section 2(18) of the Act makes it clear that "the land used exclusively for non-agricultural purpose" does not fall within the purview of the Act and therefore the respondents' claim of tenancy with respect to the said 24 cents of the land is legally untenable. Both the authorities below have erred in law'in considering his claim of tenancy with respect to the said 24 cents of the land whole of which is used by him as a dwelling house. — Kittanna Rai (deceased) by L.Rs v Sheena Poojary and Others, 2000(1) Kar. L.J. 341.
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY

Section 44(2) of the Amendment Act which gives retrospective effect to the decision of Section 14 and also nullifies judgments, decrees or orders, by removing the basis on which such judgments, decrees or orders was founded, is not unconstitutional. The Amended Act in so far as it provides for vesting in the State of tenanted lands and surplus lands in excess of the ceiling limit owned by religious institutions is not violative of Article 26 of the Constitution. Article 26 does not affect the power of the State to acquire any property belonging to a religious denomination. The Amendment of Section 63 further reducing the ceiling limit cannot be said to be unreasonable. The reduction in the ceiling limit resulting in acquisition of some lands under personal cultivation does not offend the second proviso to Article 31-A. The Amendment of the definition of 'family' in Section 2(12) by including unmarried daughters is not liable to attack as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Amendment of Section 15 by which right to resume by widows, unmarried daughters, minors and physically handicapped has been taken away is protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution. The protective cloak of Article 31-A of the Constitution is available to the machinery provisions of the law relating to agrarian reforms. Thus the protection is available to the provisions which relate to Constitution of Special Tribunals and conferring upon them adjudicatory jurisdiction. In spite of the infirmity in not providing for security of tenure of the Tribunal, and the absence of a provision for appeal, revision or reference from orders of Tribunals and for transfer of cases from one Tribunal to another, the constitutionality of Section 48 is not open to challenge, as it enjoys the protection under Article 31-A. Having excluded the jurisdiction of Civil and Criminal Courts under Sections 132 and 133, it was competent to the legislature to take away such jurisdiction retrospectively also and to render ineffective orders already made by such Courts. Hence Section 133(l)(iii) providing that all interim orders by Courts shall stand dissolved or vacated, is valid. — Sri Jagadguru Durundundeswara Sidha Sansthan Math at Nidasosi, Belgaum District v State of Karnataka and Another, 1983(1) Kar. L.J. 489.
What the 2nd proviso to Article 31-A(1), Constitution states is that whenever any land under personal cultivation which is within the ceiling limit applicable to a person as in force on the date of such acquisition is acquired by the State Government, compensation will have to be paid at a rate not less than the market value thereof. The said proviso does not impose any fetter on the legislature to reduce the ceiling limit from time to time if it wishes to do so. Bhaskar v State of Karnataka, AIR 1975 Kar. 55


ASSIGNEE FROM PERMANENT TENANT AFTER 1-3-1974 — RIGHTS
Where a mulgeni (permanent) tenant was in possession and personally cultivated the lands, on 1-3-1974 transferred his mulgeni right by registered gift deed on 15-4-1974. Under Section 44(1) of the Act, the lands held by the permanent tenant stood transferred and vested in the State Government and under Section 45(1) the only right, given to the tenant was to be registered as an occupant; and the right possessed by the tenant after the date of vesting (after 1-3-1974) was not transferable and as such the donee did not acquire the right to get himself registered as an occupant. Even assuming that the gift was a valid transfer, he could not be registered as an occupant as he was not a tenant of the land or personally cultivating the same on the date of vesting. Shambhu Eshwar Hegde v Land Tribunal, Kumta and Another, 1979(2) Kar. L.J. 194.





APPLICABILITY OF THE DEFINITION OF 'PERSON' IN THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT.
The word 'person' is not denned in the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. Therefore, the definition given in the General Clauses Act will apply. The word 'person' includes a 'joint family' and in view of Explanation II to Section 2, it is clear that the Tribunal has the power to decide whether a joint family is or is not a tenant under Section 112(b) of the Act. Explanation II to Section 2 provides that in the case of a joint family, the land shall be deemed to be cultivated personally, if it is cultivated by any member of such family. Hence, the claim of the appellants that they have been personally cultivating the lands, assuming to be correct, Explanation II to Section 2 would be attracted. — Guruvappa, K. and Another v Smt. Manjappa Hengsu and Others, ILR 1985 Kar. 386 (DB). Parwetewwa v State of Karnataka, ILR 1985 Kar. 1257.

PERSON CLAIMING TITLE — LAWFULLY CULTIVATE THE LAND.
To be a deemed tenant, one must lawfully cultivate the land belonging to another person. The word 'lawful' requires that the possession must be capable of being defended successfully, if action is taken. A deemed tenant also should pay rent. A person lawfully cultivating the land of another must necessarily pay rent for use and occupation. A person cultivating land claiming it as his own is not lawfully cultivating the land belonging to another. It is a case of dispute relating to title. A person claiming to remain in possession as owner cannot be deemed tenant. — Chokkannagari Namyanappa v Land Tribunal, Qiintamani and Another, 1982(2) Kar. L.J. 21.

Tenant' definition does not include persons who were tenants sometimes before 1-3-1974 or sometime before coming into operation of Land Reforms Act — Person claiming to be a tenant must show that he has been and he is in cultivation of land even on 1-3-1974. — Vilas Alias Gundu Ananthacharya v State of Karnataka, ILR 1987 Kar. 1428.

If a person in possession of land under such an agreement continues in possession of the property after the expiry of the period of the agreement his possession will not be that of a tenant in the absence of proof that an agreement of tenancy was entered into after the expiry of the period. Hence the question of applying the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and declaring him as a tenant would not arise. — Veerappa Rudrappa v Land Tribunal ILR1976 Kar. 116.


BEQUEATHING TENANT'S INTEREST BY WILL

Statute has premptorily provided succession which cannot be defeated by tenant by bequeathing his interest — No person can be called a tenant unless he cultivates land lawfully — When a tenant cannot bequeath right of tenancy, person claiming benefit under such a Will cannot be termed as a tenant — Such person not entitled to grant of occupancy right. — Thimmakka Kom Venkanna Naik v Land Tribunal and Others, ILR 1987 Kar. 3336 (DB).

TRUST PROPERTY AND TENANT

Agriculturist who cultivates personally land he holds on lease from landlord — Person coming within definition of tenant as on 1-3-1974 is entitled to grant of occupancy right in respect of land held by him on lease. The petitioner's father was inducted as a lawful tenant with effect from 19-6-1951 and the said lease was also approved earlier by the District Judge on 27-5-1951 as provided for in the scheme of the Management of the Trust, for the said scheme provided therein that all the leases of the agricultural land for more than three years of the respondent 1-Trust could be made only with the previous sanction of the District Judge. Therefore, the petitioner was lawful tenant as on 1-3-1974 within the meaning of Section 2(34) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. . . . The petitioner is entitled to for grant of occupancy right by the Land Tribunal and therefore the rejection of the claim by the Land Tribunal is not justified. — Satyamurthy v Siddaroodmath Punch Committee, Hubli and Others, 1997(2) Kar. L.J. 631.


TENANT IN POSSESSION AFTER DETERMINATION OF TENANCY — RIGHT TO OCCUPANCY.
Respondent 2 had cultivated the lands as tenant even prior to 1956. Petitioner — Landlord sent a registered notice under Section 31(i)(a) BTAL Act terminating respondent 2's tenancy on 28-3-1955 and on the expiry of the period of one year, filed an application for possession. The matter went up to the High Court which upheld the claim of the landlord and granted 3 months time to respondent 2 to harvest the standing crop, which time expired on 8-12-1961. respondent 2 filed application claiming occupancy rights and the same was granted by the Land Tribunal. On the writ by landlord. After the tenancy of respondent 2 came to be validly determined by the notice issued by the petitioner, he (R-2) continued to be in possession not as a tenant but as a tresspasser. Respondent-2 was not a tenant within and protected by Section 2(e) Tenants Temporary Protection from Eviction Act, 1961. Respondent 2 was not a tenant on the lands in question as on 1-3-1974 though he was cultivating these lands. When that is so, the lands could not, in law, vest in the Government. Hence, no question of conferring occupancy right on respondent 2 arises. Basayya v Land Tribunal, Hungund and Another, 1978(2) Kar. L.J. 131.


DISPUTES CONNECTED WITH AGRARIAN RELATIONS

Section 4 of Act 31 of 1974, is applicable to cases where relief of injunction is claimed in disputes connected with agrarian relations; and has no application to suits for enforcement of easementary right or rights of that nature. Where the plaintiff claimed that by virtue of an agreement entered into between the parties, plaintiff had acquired the right to convey water for irrigating his land through the lands of the defendants, a suit to prevent infringement of a right of this nature is not one to which Act 31 of 1974 has any application. The power of granting interim injunction ex parte has to be exercised with great caution by Civil Courts. The Trial Court was justified in making the order of temporary injunction ex parte. — Gurupadayya Nagayya v Mahadu Arjun, AIR 1976 Kant. 66 : ILR 1976 Kar. 151.

DEEMED TENANCY — CLAIM BY PERSON CULTIVATING LAND

Claim is sustainable only if possession and cultivation is lawful — Where cultivation of land by person is without authority of real owner of land, claim for deemed tenancy on basis of such cultivation being carried on is not sustainable. Deemed tenancy is available only in the case of tenant who is lawfully cultivating the lands. Admittedly in the case on hand the real owner, the Mutt has not permitted or granted the respondent to cultivate the land belonging to Mutt. Therefore Section 4 is not available to the petitioner. — Kanthu v The Land Tribunal, Siddapur, Uttara Kannada District and Others, 2001(2) Kar. LJ. 477B.


CASE LAW ON RIGHT TO PROPERTY



Right to property under Art 300A of constitution of India: No person can be deprived of his property save by authority of law. This implies further without paying just compensation for it. Maneka Gandhi case: AIR 1978 SC 597.



Law which authorizes compulsory acquisition should be a law of the legislature or a rule having the force of law. B.D.Chandra Mohan case: AIR 1982 SC 33.



Art 31(1) & (2) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA imposes limitations on the power of the state and declares the corresponding guarantee of the individual to his right to property. Swami Motor Transport co.(p)ltd case: AIR 1963 SC 864.

Purchasers of lands proposed for acquisition subsequent to the publication of preliminary notification do not get any right to challenge the acquisition proceedings. ILR 1998 Kar 1441, ILR 1998 (4) Kar 4172.








CASE LAW ON RULE OF ESTOPPEL


If a man either by words or by conduct has intimated that he consents to an act which has been done and that he will not offer any opposition to it, although it could not have been lawfully done without his consent, and he thereby induces others to do that which they otherwise might have abstained from, he cannot question legality of the act he had sanctioned to the prejudice of those who have so given faith to his words or to the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct. FOR FULL CASE CLICK HERE








CASE LAW ON INAM LANDS



INAM LANDS CASE BEFORE SC
1979 amending act takes away jurisdiction of DC to confer occupancy rights over inam lands and gives to Land Tribunal. In case of Shri Kudli Sringeri Mahasamsthanam Kudli case Reported in ILR 1992 Kar 1827 Division Bench of KHC while dealing with issue of religious and charitable imams struck down the amending act. The issue was settled by Supreme Court by partially overruling the order stating that the personal and misceleneous imams are not affected by such order.FOR FULL CASE CLICK HERE




UNDER MYSORE (PERSONAL AND MISCELLANEOUS) INAMS ABOLITION ACT, 1954, SECTION 5 — PERMANENT TENANTS ARE REGISTERED AS OCCUPANTS ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS. THE CONDITION DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY RESTRICTION ON ALIENATION.

1. Granted land — Definition of — Only Government land granted to person belonging to any Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, under provisions of any enactment, is to be considered as "granted land"


2. Tenanted inam land that stood vested in State Government consequent upon abolition of inams, does not become "granted land" when occupancy right in respect of land is conferred on tenant thereof, merely because tenant happened to be person belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe — Vesting of tenanted inam land in State Government is not absolute but is subject to vested right of tenant to got occupancy conferred on him and conferment of occupancy right on tenant by Special Deputy Commissioner does not amount to making grant of land — Alienation of inam land by tenant after fitting occupancy right conferred on him is not hit by prohibition contained in Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978.


3. Hon,ble Justice D.V. Shylendra Kumar, Held in a case of M. Munikenchappa v The Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District, Bangalore and Others, Reported in 2004(3) Kar. L.J. 579.: The land in question was the subject-matter of the- order of the Special Deputy Commissioner exercising his jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Act. An order of this nature is one passed for recognizing a pre-existing right of a person who is already in possession. The Special Deputy Commissioner virtually functions as a Tribunal for such purposes, In respect of lands for which occupancy rights are conferred such a land cannot be construed as a 'granted land' under the provisions of Section 3(l)(b) of the Act. The subject land which was also the subject-matter of the order dated 3-2-1962 passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner and in exercise of his powers under Section 5 of the Inams Abolition Act, cannot be construed as a 'granted land' within the meaning of this phrase occurring in Section 3(l)(b) of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978.



THE MYSORE (PERSONAL AND MISCELLANEOUS) INAMS ABOLITION ACT, 1954 [MYSORE ACT No, 1 OF 1955]

THIS ACT’S VALIDITY IS DISCUSSED IN A.R. VENKATACHALA IYENGAR V STATE OF MYSORE REPORTED IN 1964 Mys. LJ. Supp. 171.





It is not correct to state that an inam grant represents only the alienation by the State either partially or wholly of its rights to levy assessment and as it does not involve the grant of land or any other right in the land all that could vest in the State by the notification under Section 1(4) was the right to the land revenue and that no right to land itself or any other right relating to the land could vest in the State. Differences between the position of the erstwhile inamdars of inam villages and owners of large holdings in ryotwari villages are inevitable when a programme of land legislation is undertaken by the Legislature in stages as it necessarily must do. There is nothing in the Act which exempts unsurveyed villages from the operation of the Act. The creation of a category of tenants called quasi-permanent tenants with certain rights is within competence of the legislature, and further inamdars who have lost all their rights in the inams have no locus standi to question the manner in which rights in inam lands are disposed of. It being entirely within the power of the legislature to fix the quantum of compensation without reference to the actual value of the items acquired, it follows that the different bases adopted for different items cannot be questioned. The provision in Section 6(1)(2) enabling quasi-permanent tenants to be registered as occupants if they had been unlawfully dispossessed by the inamdar during the period indicated is not vague. Placing the burden of proof in regard to quasi-permanent tenants on the inamdar is within legislative competence. Grants and rights safeguarded by earlier statutes could be altered by the competent legislature and it cannot be challenged. Apart from the express inclusion of the term 'inam' in Article 31-A (2) (d) of the Constitution, the definition of estate in Mysore Land Revenue Code includes the interest of an inamdar in his holding. Under Section 11 of the Act land revenue is payable only with effect on and from the date of vesting and is not retrospective in its operation. The same considerations apply to crops on the land raised before the vesting and the rents or other amounts, due from tenants in respect of any period prior to the vesting. While any clear provision for retroactivity has no doubt to be given full effect, there is no warrant for depriving the inamdars of pre-existing rights in the absence of a specific provision depriving them of such rights. There is no reason for denying inamdars copies of circular issued by Government calling upon tenants to deposit rent, since it affected rights of inamdars. The instructions making tentative arrangement for payment of rents are not irregular or improper. Section 9-A making tenancies heritable relates to land tenure and is valid. It is not all enfranchised inams in respect of which full land revenue assessment is payable that are excluded under the Act. If the amount payable by the holder of an enfranchised inam falls short of the full assessment reckoned on the basis of a survey of the village, such inam will not come under the exemption. The definition of estates in Mysore Land Revenue Code includes every variety of interest in land including a ryotwari tenure. Enfranchisement does not deprive the holding of the character of an inam altogether in the case of inams which do not pay to Government the whole of the assessable land revenue, since the difference necessarily represents the alienated or transferred portion of such revenue.



Where after the vesting in Government of the inam village plaintiff sued for a declaration that he was a permanent tenant of certain lands in the village immediately before the vesting of the inam village and for possession: Held, the Civil Court could grant neither the relief for declaration nor the one for possession. The effect of Inams Abolition Act was that the relationship of landlord and tenant as between the Inamdar and the permanent tenant whoever he was, became extinguished when the inam village vested in the Government, and the only right or privilege to which the permanent tenant, in the inam village became entitled- on the extinguishment of the permanent tenancy was to get registered as occupant in -respect of the lands of which he was a permanent tenant before the date of vesting. Plaintiff's remedy was by way of an application for registration under Section 5 read with Rules. — Kempamma v S. Kempanna 1964(2) Mys. L.J. 444.

In 1958 plaintiff brought the suit for a declaration that he was the absolute owner of certain lands and a house and for possession thereof, on the allegation that on October 1, 1951 there was unlawful dispossession by defendants. The plaintiff in addition sought a decree for past mesne profits and desired an enquiry into future mesne profits. The plaintiff also asked for possession of some movable properties or in the alternative for damages. The lands involved in the suit were situate in an inam village and that village vested in the Government during the pendency of the suit on February 1, 1959 under the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954. Held, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the suit was not divested by reason of the vesting of the inam in the Government under the Inams Abolition Act. The jurisdiction to try the suit in respect of the house and movables stood in no manner affected by the vesting under the Inams Abolition Act. The question as to who was the owner of the suit land either as inamdar or in the exercise of any other right during the period between the date of the institution of the suit or at any other anterior point of time to the point of time relevant for purposes of Sections 4 to 9 of the Act, which is the point of time immediately before the date of vesting, and whether plaintiff was entitled to mesne profits were not questions which could be adjudicated upon by the Deputy Commissioner but only by the Civil Court and the subsequent vesting of the inam village in the Government conferring cetain powers on the Deputy Commissioners to decide claims for registration cannot divest the jurisdiction which resided in the Civil Court in that matter. — Rangappa v Chinnappaiah, 1965(1) Mys. LJ. 145.



The Act relates to agrarian reform and is protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution and cannot be challenged on the ground that the Act does not provide for adequate compensation. Since Article 31 provides for express limitations on the power to acquire property there is no room for implying any limitation in Entry 36 of List II. — B. Shankar Rao v State of Mysore, AIR 1969 SC 453.



Miscellaneous Inams does not include Talari service inams — Hence order granting of such land under the Act void — Sale of such land by grantee confers no right. In clause (d) of sub- section (3) of Section 1 of the Act, it is abundantly made clear that service inams held by Talaris are excluded from the purview of the Act. Therefore, the granting authority viz., the Deputy Commissioner cannot have power to grant such a land. Grant cannot be sustained as it is one without jurisdiction and it does not confer any right, title or interest on the grantee. The vendee gets no title over the property as his vendor himself has no title to be conveyed. — Muniyappa v State and Others, ILR 1991 Kar. 3504.



The inamdar executed a simple mortgage of the inam village in 1929 and in 1932 executed a lease in favour of defendant who was then a minor. The mortgagee sued on the mortgage and in execution purchased the village and obtained symbolic possession and then sold the village to plaintiff in 1941. In 1951 plaintiff sued for possession. In 1961 the suit was decreed in second appeal by the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal the Special Deputy Commissioner for inams passed orders registering the defendant as permanent tenant. Held, (i) by reason of Sections 3 and 4 of the Inams Abolition Act the plaintiff had no right to possession as all interest in the inam vested in the State. (ii) As the mortgagee was not entitled to possession under the mortgage, any alleged adverse possession by defendant against the mortgagor would not affect the mortgagee and it was only from the date that the mortgagee obtained symbolic possession that any adverse possession by the defendant could possibly arise and the suit within 12 years of that date was not barred under Article 144, Limitation Act. (iii) But plaintiff was entitled to mesne profits from the date of suit till the estate vested in the State (2-10-1959). The Act does not affect the right of an erstwhile inamdar to obtain arrears of rent or mesne profits upto the date of vesting. The order of the Special Deputy Commissioner registering defendant as tenant did not bar the Court from determining the title of the plaintiff in respect of the land upto the date of its vesting in the State. The lease in favour of the minor was void and defendant had no tenancy rights and therefore plaintiff was entitled to recover mesne profits. — Lalithamma v Subbanna, 1969(2) SCWR 414.




Personal Inams abolished — Jodi village came to be vested in State — Kadim tenants seeking occupancy rights — No evidence of Kadim tenancy — Plea of Kadim tenancy and pendency of proceedings before Land Tribunal after-thought and cannot be accepted. — Venugopala Singh v B.M. Chikkaputtappa and Others, ILR 1991 Kar. 2196.













On the abolition of inam tenure, the lands vested in the Government during 1959. Petitioner claiming to be permanent tenant applied for occupancy right and he was granted occupancy in December, 1954 and was required to pay the premium in ten instalments, the last of which was paid in March, 1974. Respondents who were cultivating the lands under petitioner applied for grant of occupancy rights under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. Held, the vesting of the lands in Government both under Inams Abolition Act and the Land Reforms Act was only notional subject to the rights and interests of the actual cultivators of the lands. Persons entitled to claim occupancy rights under the Acts would be entitled to make their claims. The Authorities should take up investigation into the claims firstly under the Act brought into force earlier. After the rights are determined under the Act, investigation should made into the claims under the other enactment brought into force subsequently. The subsisting relationship between the permanent tenant or holder of the minor inam on the one hand and that of their tenants on the other was not affected by the Inams Abolition Act. This is classified by Section 34-A of the 1954 Act incorporated by Act 16 of 1960. Thus persons cultivating as sub-lessees and tenants under permanent tenants or holders of the inam acquired the status of tenants vis a vis their immediate superior holders and if that relationship continued as on 1-3-1974. Such lands rested in the State Government under Section 44, Land Reforms Act and the tenants could apply for occupancy rights under the Land Reforms Act. — P.R. Rangachar v Land Tribunal Hoskote and Another, 1979(1) Kar. LJ. 457.




One Muniraju claiming to be the son of late Muninagappa filed an application before the Tahsildar for changing the name in the katha and entering his name in the same. The Tahsildar has issued an endorsement to the effect that the said land is vested in the Government and therefore, the question of entering the name of the applicant in the revenue records does not arise. Feeling aggrieved by the same, Muniraju has filed an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner under Section 136(2) of the Act. There also it is not the case of Muniraju that his late father Muninagappa has filed any application for grant of occupancy rights under the Inams Abolition Act. It is significant to note that the Assistant Commissioner has given a specific finding in the order that the petitioners herein have admitted that they are not aware whether late Muninagappa had filed any application for grant of occupancy rights in respect of the land in question before Special Deputy Commissioner. This admission itself suffice for this Court to infer an adverse inference against these petitioners because these petitioners were not parties before the Assistant Commissioner in the appeal filed by Muniraju. Further, in the revision filed by these petitioners before the Special Deputy Commissioner, Muniraju was not a party. Only the petitioners are the parties before the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner has given a specific finding that the said late Muninagappa had no right or title over the land in question. Neither the Jodidar nor alienee in succession have got the occupancy right registered in their names and as such ultimately, the land vested with the Government as unclaimed. In such an event, possession of the land by any individual is unauthorised and it cannot be recognised. Further, it is also admitted by the petitioners that neither their husband nor they made any application for conferment of the occupancy right. Accordingly, their claim was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner. .... The petitioners have not made out a case for interfering with the impugned orders. At no point of time the petitioners nor their late husband, Muninagappa made any attempt or persuaded the respondents to consider their alleged application for grant of occupancy right. Only when the matter was pending consideration before the Revisional Authority, the petitioners have filed a copy of the application alleged to have filed for grant of occupancy rights. The said application is not duly signed. The said document relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is not an authenticated application alleged to have been filed by the late husband of petitioners Sri Muninagappa. There is an inordinate delay of more than four decades. This Court cannot exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution at this belated stage. — Yemakka and Another v The Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore Urban District, Bangalore and Another, 2002(6) Kar. LJ. 506.




A purchaser of inam land from a tenant in possession after the land had vested in Government is entitled to make an application for registry as permanent tenant. The interest possessed by his vendor was an interest in respect of immoveable property which could be sold. If the vendor-tenant was competent to make an application under the Act, his right to occupancy stood transferred to the purchaser. — Sreenivasamurthy v State of Mysore, (1975)1 Kar. L.J. Jr. 60, Sh. N. 175.






Inam Land — Grant of — Joint grant in favour of two persons not being members of same family — Grantees take granted land equally between themselves — Such grant would not enure to benefit of brothers of one of grantees — Those brothers have no right or title in granted land and sale and mortgage deeds executed by them are null and void. 1 acre 16 guntas of land in Survey No. 40 has been granted by the Inams Abolition Deputy Commissioner on 4-1-1964 in favour of first defendant Channappa and second defendant Chikkanna 'jointly'. It is clearly stated that this 1 acre 16 guntas of land has been 'jointly' granted. It could be seen from the pedigree that Channappa and Chikkanna were not members of the same family. Second defendant Chikkanna is the son of Channarayappa and this Channarayappa is the brother of first defendant Channappa. If the grant of the suit Survey No. 40 measuring 1 acre 16 guntas were to go to the benefit of the joint family, it would have been granted in favour of first defendant Channappa and his brother deceased Channarayappa. But, to repeat, it has been granted in favour of first defendant Channappa and his brother's son second defendant Chikkanna. ... So the joint grant in favour of first defendant Channappa and second defendant Chikkanna as per Ex. D-l, does not enure to the benefit of second defendant Chikkanna's two brothers, Gangappa and third defendant Cheluvaiah. In view of the aforesaid discussion, deceased Gangappa had no right to mortgage the suit property in favour of first defendant Channappa. The Joint grant as per Ex. D-l was made in favour of first defendant Channappa and second defendant Chikkanna. They have not executed any sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. The sale deed dated 6-12-1968 for a consideration of Rs. 800/- was executed by deceased Gangappa and third defendant Cheluvaiah in favour of the plaintiff. Deceased Gangappa and third defendant Cheluvaiah had no right in the suit property and they were not competent to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff conveying title to the plaintiff. The sale deed does not convey any title to the plaintiff. — Channappa and Another v Channarayappa (Deceased) by LRs. and Another, 1997(5) Kar. L.J. 122A.







.








Admittedly, when the vendor of the 3rd respondent was registered as an occupant in respect of the land in question under Section 9 of the Act, the alleged tank was not used for several years prior to that. No doubt, the vendor of the 3rd respondent had given an undertaking when he was registered as an occupant under Section 9 of the Act that he would hand over possession of the land, if the authorities take steps to restore the tank. The vendor of the land was entitled to be registered as an occupant under the provisions of the-Inams Abolition Act. Merely because he has given an undertaking that he would hand over possession of the land in question whenever the authorities desire to restore the tank in question, does not mean that the authorities can exercise that power at any length of time. The notice of eviction was admittedly issued on 17th July, 1983. The vendor of the 3rd respondent was registered as occupant on 25th July, 1961. It is well established that any power conferred on an authority must be exercised by that authority in a fair and reasonable manner and _for the purpose for which such powers are conferred and in that it is implicit that the power conferred also should be exercised within a reasonable time. This is the principle behind the law of limitation. Notwithstanding the undertaking given by the vendor of the land in question to the 3rd respondent, the authorities should have exercised their right to evict either the vendor or his successors-in-interest within the reasonable time from the date of the grant. ..... The finding recorded by the Tribunal shows that the 3rd respondent has developed the land by raising 200 Coconut plants, 50 Mango trees and 100 Eucalyptus trees on the said land. Therefore, it was not permissible for the Tahsildar to pass an order of eviction against the 3rd respondent after 23 years from the date of grant made in his favour. If it is permitted, it would result in serious injury to the 3rd respondent affecting his property right guaranteed to him under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. — Buddappa and Others v Deputy Commissioner, Kolar District, Kolar and Others, 2000(1) Kar. L.J. Sh. N. 23A.






Tank bed or other communal land meant for the use of members of the public for cultivation of lands in the vicinity are exempted under the Inams Abolition Act and grant of such lands is illegal. The members of the village community have locus standi to challenge such grants. — Ninganna and Others v Narayana Gowdci and Others, AIR 1983 Kant. 116 (DB).




.
The Civil Court ceases to have jurisdiction to decide the question of title, when once the land vested in the Government under the Inams Abolition Act. All such questions have to be decided only by the special forum created under the Act. Houses are not exempt from vesting under the Inams Abolition Act. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the question of title even with regard to house property situate on inam land. — Manikyam, C. v R. Thimmiah, 1983(1) Kar. LJ. 328.









This means that the parties should be given the fullest opportunity to produce the oral and documentary evidence on which they rely as also to cross-examine witnesses giving evidence against them and that there should be opportunity for confrontation of contending parties. No decision should be taken on the basis of the report of the Tahsildar placed on record behind the back of the affected party. — Lingasetty v The Mysore Reveiiue Appellate Tribunal, 1963(2) Mys. L.J. 36.


Plaintifl sued for partition of an inam village but then the village had vested in the Government under the Inams Abolition Act. Held, the Court was entitled to issue a commission to the Deputy Commissioner to effect a partition of the lands which could be registered under Section 9 of the Act. Section 9 entitles an Inamdar to be registered as occupant of lands other than those referred to in that section and it is the duty of the Inams Deputy Commissioner to decide which are those which could be registered under Section 9. Where there are two persons who are entitled to registration under Section 9, it is the duty of The Deputy Commissioner to make the necessary partition. — A.E, Ammanna v K. Seetharama Bhatta, 1965(1) Mys. L.J. 622.








It is a well-settled law that if a party approaches the wrong legal forum and considerable time elapses and the party is thereafter required to approach the correct forum, that the intervening period cannot be treated as a bar as far as limitation is concerned because the law recognizes that the party who has been pursuing a legal remedy is entitled to claim exclusion of that period of time. . . If the type of proceeding instituted turns out to be erroneous that the Court has the power to direct corrective action because it comes within the doctrine of curability. A.C. Anantha Swamy and Another v State of Karnataka and Others, 1998(5) Kar. L.J. 480-A.






Once the land has been recognised as converted land by the Deputy Commissioner exercising power under the Inams Abolition Act, the Deputy Commissioner cannot insist on payment of conversion fine once again. — Krishnamurthy v Right-aids Orient Private Limited, 1973(2) Mys. L.J. Sh N. 263.





THE MYSORE (RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE) INAMS ABOLITION ACT, 1955 [MYSORE ACT No. 18 OF 1955]


Village treated as personal inam — Subsequent decision it was devadaya — Validity. Where a village was treated as a personal and miscellaneous inam under the Personal and Miscellaneous Inams Abolition Act and petitioner was registered under Section 9 of the Act, and that decision had become final (on 28-1-1968), a right accrued to the petitioner and the same could not be taken away by a Government Notification under Section 1(4) of the Religious and Charitable Inams Abolition Act notifying that the village shall be and shall always be deemed to have been a devadaya inam. — Anniacher v State of Mysore, (1974)1 Kar. L.J. Jr. 26, Sh. N. 93.






Tenant cultivating land or archak, poojari, etc. — where land in question is not proved to be religious or charitable land, nor to be agricultural land, claim for occupancy is not maintainable. The building site in question is not an agricultural land and the petitioner is conducting commercial activities thereon. Explanation appended to the said sub-section provides an exhaustive definition to 'religious inams' or 'charitable inams' to mean a grant of a village, portion of a village or land entered in the register of inams, quit-rent register, alienation register, or any revenue account maintained by or under the authority of Government as Devadaya inam or Dharmadaya inam, as the case may be. In the present case, the Tribunal has come to a definite conclusion that the site in question has not been centered either in the quit-rent register or any of the other revenue records maintained by or under the authority of the Government as Devadaya inam or Dharmadaya inam. Therefore the site is not a religious .or charitable inam within the meaning of Section 1(3) of the Act. In the said view of the matter the provisions of the Act cannot be said to have any application to the same. Occupancy right can be claimed by a person as a tenant only if the lands are agricultural in nature and the person claiming right is personally cultivating the same. In the present case, admittedly the lands are not agricultural in nature and the petitioners are admittedly carrying on commercial activities over the same. In the said view of the matter there was no occasion on their part to claim occupancy right in respect of the lands in question. — Savithramma and Others v State of Karnataka and Others, 1998(3) Kar. L.J. 154.





Petitioners applications claiming occupancy of Inam lands endowed to temples were pending adjudication and in the meantime the Deputy Commissioner directed the Assistant Commissioner to take possession of the lands from the petitioners. Held, that the Record of rights extracts produced by the petitioners raised a presumption in their favour that ' Ley were tenants of the lands. Therefore they had a right to remain in possession under the proviso to Section 3(l)(g) of the Act, until evicted in accordance with taw. — Boraiah v State of Karnataka, 1975(2) Kar. L.J. Jr. 35, Sh. N. 67.


.
The land tribunal has the jurisdiction to consider the claim for grant of occupancy right under the Land Reforms Act in respect of lands in respect of which occupancy right had been granted to an Inamdar under the Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, 1955. But the granting of occupancy right could be only on the basis that the claimant had become a tenant of such land of the Inamdar on and after the date of vesting of the land in the Government under that Act and/or after grant of occupancy right to the Inamdar under the said 1955 Act, for, under Section 8 of that Act, occupancy right could and would have been granted to an Inamdar only in respect of lands which were not under cultivation of Kadim tenants or permanent tenants who were entitled to occupancy right under Sections 4 and 5 thereof or in respect of which there were no other category of tenants, who were entitled to continue as tenants under the Government as provided in Section 6 of that Act. The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court had upheld that occupancy right had been granted in favour of the temple (petitioner) under Section 8 of the Religious and Charitable Inams Abolition Act. In that order the claims of the respondents that they were permanent tenants of the lands and their alternative claim that they were deemed tenants as defined under Section 4 of the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1954, and therefore entitled to continue as tenants under the Government, as other tenants under Section 6 of the Act were rejected. Further their possession was held to be unlawful. The respondent had not claimed before the land tribunal that they had become tenants of the petitioner on and after the date of vesting of the lands in the Government under the Religious and Charitable Inams Aboiition Act and/or after the grant of occupancy rights in favour of the temple. On the other hand their plea was the same which had been rejected by this Court. The lands therefore were not tenanted lands and the respondents were not tenants as on 1-3-1974; the appointed day under the Land Reforms Act, and therefore the Tribunal could not have granted the occupancy right for the lands in question in favour of the respondents. Under Section 4 of the Mysore Tenancy Act and Section 4 of the Land Reforms Act (both worded similarly), only a person lawfully cultivating an agricultural land could claim the status of a deemed tenant and not a person who has been in unlawful possession of the land. The claim of the respondents that they were deemed tenants of the land in question was rejected by this Court (Karnataka High Court), holding that they were in unlawful possession of the land. From this, it follows, the view taken by the Tribunal that they were deemed tenants under Section 4 of the Land Reforms Act (similarly worded in Section 4 of the Mysore Tenancy Act) is patently erroneous. — Sri Dharmarayaswamy Temple (by the Committee of Dharmadarshis) v Chinnathayappa and Others, ILR 1990 Kar. 4242 (DB).






It may be stated that the purpose and scope of the two Acts are distinct. The Inams Abolition Act was enacted for the purpose of abolition of Inam Tenures and conversion of such tenures into Ryotwari Tenures and in that process grant of occupancy rights to the Inamdars and the three classes of tenants specified in the Act. The purpose of the Land Reforms Act, however, is quite different. The main purpose was to abolish the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of tenanted lands and to confer occupancy rights on tenants who are personally cultivating the lands. Therefore, the rejection of the claim of the appellant under the Inams Abolition Act does not lead to the inference that he has no claim for occupancy right under the Land Reforms Act. The appellant claims that he is a deemed tenant as provided under Section 4 of the Land Reforms Act. The requirement of deemed tenant, as provided under Section 4 of the Tenancy Act, must be determined by the land Tribunal. The High Court having come to the conclusion that the procedure adopted by the land Tribunal was not in accordance with the rules of natural justice ought to have remitted the matter to the tribunal for fresh disposal. — Muniyallappa v BM. Krishnamurthy and Others, AIR 1992 SC 212 (FB).



Jurisdiction of Land Tribunal under Land Reforms Act is restricted to granting or rejecting occupancy in respect of agricultural land and it cannot grant occupancy in respect of non-agricultural land. D.M. Ramachandra Rao v State of Karnataka and Another, 1997(5) Kar. L.J. 614.





It appears that the Tahsildar has arrogated himself the power to represent the temples which are not Muzrai Institutions. The Tahsildar is not a representative of the temples but is only a representative of the Government which does not have any away over these temples for the reason that they are not Muzrai Institutions. The necessary parties are atleast the senior members of the village community to whom these temples belong. Valuable rights of occupancy cannot be bartered away in this fashion by the Tribunal. — Yejman Eregowda and others v State of Karnataka and Others, 1991(1) Kar. LJ. 509.


Land gifted in favour of deity Sri Devarayanadurga Laxminarasimhaswamy — Donor ceased to the owner. The Tahsildar was not competent to lease the land to any person beyond the period of five years. It is not the case of respondent 3 that he continued to enjoy the rightful or lawful possession of the land in question with the permission of the Government or the competent authority even after the expiry of the lease, as nothing is produced to show that any such order was passed by the competent authority permitting him to enjoy the land beyond the period of lease granted in the instant case. Therefore, the irresistible conclusion is that possession of respondent 3 cannot be continued beyond the lease period of five years as enjoined by Section 9, though he was enjoying the leasehold rights by virtue of the order made by the Tahsildar. In that view of the matter, it is not impermissible for respondent 3 to have continued in possession of the land in question beyond five years. At the out-set, it is not made clear whether the land in question was available for the Deputy Commissioner to grant occupancy right under the Act in favour of respondent 3. It was the bounden duty of the Deputy Commissioner to apply his mind and see whether the land was available for being granted under the Act. Having regard to the provisions of the Act of 1927, a notice should have been given to the Muzrai officer including Dharmadarshis of the temple. The Deputy Commissioner failed to issue such notice to either the Muzrai Officer or the Endowment Commissioner. Be that as it may, as on the date when the impugned order, Annexure-G, came to be passed by the Deputy Commissioner, he should have seen that there was a prohibition incorporated in Section 9 of the Act of 1927 to grant a land like the one involved here under the Act. He should have also seen that respondent 3, having no right to claim occupancy over the land in question, would not be entitled for the reliefs sought for under the Act, which cannot be pressed into service in a case like this. Therefore, the order made by the Deputy Commissioner as per Annexure-G being one without the authority of law is vitiated. — S. Sumitra v State of Kamataka and Others, ILR 1992 Kar. 3049.



Occupancy — Rival applicants for — Order of Special Deputy Commissioner granting occupancy to one applicant on finding that he was "Archak" personally cultivating land during relevant period — No decision taken on rival 'application received subsequently, though received in time, and passing on pending application to Land Tribunal for disposal under Land Reforms Act — Order of Land Tribunal rejecting application on ground that occupancy in respect of subject land had already been granted by Special Deputy Commissioner and that Tribunal had no jurisdiction to revoke order of Special Deputy Commissioner — Both orders, held, are liable to be quashed — Special Deputy Commissioner ought to have recalled his order of grant and passed fresh order after considering both applications, and when Special Deputy Commissioner had failed to do so, Land Tribunal should have done it. Ramaiah Reddy v Nanjundaradhya and Others, 2000(2) Kar. LJ. 275.


.

Where the inams in question constitute a minor inam (patel inam) in an alienated religious inam village, the claim for occupancy right should be determined as follows. Whether the lands are patel inam should first be determined by the authorities constituted under the Mysore Religious and Charitable Inams Abolition Act, 1955. If it is established that the lands are patel inam, then the provisions of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act would be attracted; and after the rights of the parties are worked out and determined under the Act of 1961 by the authorities constituted under that Act the Land Tribunal will have to take up for consideration the application for conferment of occupancy. — H. Eswarappa v State of Karnataka, 1979(2) Kar. LJ. 182.






THE KARNATAKA VILLAGE OFFICES ABOLITION ACT, 1961 [KARNATAKA ACT NO. 14 OF 1961]


Regrant — Of service inam land resumed by State Government on abolition of village offices — Only authorised holder of village office, satisfying requirements under Section 5 of Act, viz., holding village office immediately prior to appointed date and payment of occupancy price, is entitled to regrant — Whether person in possession of land is "authorised holder of village office" is to be found before regrant can be made to such person — Order of regrant to person in possession without such finding is not sustainable in law. G. V. Subba Rao v Tahsildar, Chickkaballapur Town, Kolar District and Others, 1998(3) Kar. L.J. 413-A (DB).





Watandar is also a holder of village office. The question involved is whether a Watandar is also a 'holder of Village Office' within the meaning of the definition of that expression in Karnataka Village Officers Abolition Act, 1961. The Karnataka High Court has held that he is a holder of village office within the meaning of the definition and we see no reason to depart from that view. — M.B. patil v K.V. Patil (dead) by LRs., 1987 (Supp) SCC 317.

The petitioner is not a person having a right to perform the duties of such office under the existing law as he is not a holder of the office. It is inferable that himself and his forefathers have been performing the duties as substitutes and were enjoying the emoluments attached to the office. Possibility of some dissidents of the original barawardar refused to perform the duties or abandoned to perform the duties, is not ruled out. Therefore, under these circumstances it can only be said that the petitioner and his forefathers might have been working as substitute to carry on day-to-day work. By virtue of Section 4 of the Act, village offices together with incidents thereof were abolished, notwithstanding anything in any usage, custom, settlement, grant, agreement, sanad, or in any decree or order of a Court, or in an existing law relating to village offices, and all the rights thereof extinguished. A person who was the holder of the village office immediately prior to the appointed date is entitled for regrant of the emoluments attached to this office subject to payment of occupancy price determined by the State Government. There is no reference to the officiator in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. The purport and object of the Act is to confer benefits only to the barawardars and the persons who are the holders of the office. The Legislature has clearly excluded the officiator or a substitute for regrant of land. In view of this legislative intendment, the petitioner is not entitled for regrant of inam land. No special benefits accrued to the substitute or an officiator under the said Act. — Deshaiah alias Thibbaiah v Chinnaswaniy and Others, 1995(5) Kar. LJ. 407





Any alienation of the land endowed upon a village. office after the coming into force of the Act i.e., 1-2-1963 and before the regrant of the resumed land, would not entitle the purchaser seeking benefit either under Section 5 or Section 6 much less the benefit that may be conferred on the grantee would endure to the alienee. — Gangappa v State of Karnataka and Others, 1991(2) Kar. LJ. 501-A.






The land came to be sold in favour of the petitioner on 23-2-1972. As on that day Section 7 of the Act had not been amended, much less Section 5 of the Act. But, by virtue of the amendment in 1978 (Karnataka Act 13 of 1978), sub-section (3) of Section 5 came to be amended to the effect that the grantee was prohibited from alienating the granted land for a period of 15 years from 7-8-1978. But, by a perusal of the Act it is seen that Sections 3, 5 and 7-A shall come into force at once that is to say 7-8-1978 and all the other provisions shall be deemed to have come into force on 27th December, 1975. There was no order made by the Tahsildar regranting the land in question as on 7-8-1978. But when he passed the impugned order on the 30th August, 1978 both the amended provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 5, Section 7 were in force. In that view of the matter, the impugned order having been made under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act, no person other than holder of the village office or authorised holder would be entitled to seek benefit of it. — S.N. Sampathkumar v Tahsildar, Nelamangala Taluk and Others, ILR 1991 Kar. 4030.









Following the Ruling in the case of Shivappa Fakirappa Shetsanadi, held that after-the abolition of the village office and resumption of the land, it becomes a ryotwari land only on regrant and as such, it would be released from the nature of its impartibility and becomes available for partition. — Bhimappa Ramappa Ghasti v Arjan Laxman Ghasti, 1993(2) Kar. L.J. 179 (DB).


It is true that the alleged guttedar Shamanna has executed a registered lease deed, a certified copy of which is available from the records, in favour of Hajee Zailulabdeen Saheb as far back as on 9-4-1918. It is registered in the Office of the Sub- Registrar, Gandhinagar, Bangalore, in No. 3955, Book-I, Volume 344, pages 338 to 343. Undisputedly, this document confers certain right of lease on the lessee. There is no doubt about it. The question is whether the lessor Shamanna had any right to lease the land in favour of the lessee. To answer this, we will have to fall back on the question whether the land in question was endowed upon the village office 'thoti' so as to bring it within the purview of the provisions of the Village Offices Abolition Act, or whether it was governed by the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 or Karnataka Certain Inams Abolition Act, 1977, as the case may be. From the documents which have been issued by the competent authorities, it is abundantly made clear that the land in question has been endowed upon the village office 'thoti' of Kalagondanahalli village and that Muniswamy @ Gogga was the holder of the village office 'thoti'. So naturally the land is governed by the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act and not by the Inams Abolition Acts, referred to above. By a careful consideration of the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner, it is seen that he has failed to record a finding that the land was coming within the ambit of the provisions of the trams Abolition Act and therefore he was competent to grant occupancy over it. Perusal of Sections 4 to 9 of the Act of 1954 makes it clear that either holder of a minor mam or a tenant qualified therein, after the land came to vest in the State, shall make an application .for occupancy right over the land in their lawful possession as such on the appointed date. The Deputy Commissioner failed to see that the applicant Abdul Jaleel was neither a tenant nor a holder of a minor inam. Lastly, the Deputy Commissioner failed to see whether he had jurisdiction to confer occupancy over the land of this kind. Considering all these aspects, I am clearly of the opinion that the impugned order, Annexure-D, made by the learned Civil Judge cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be quashed. — Muniswamy @ Gogga (dead) by legal representative v State of Karnataka and Others, 1993(1) Kar. LJ. 498.



Personal law of parties not affected by provisions of Act — Interest in village office enures to the benefit of junior members of coparcenary/joint family and available for partition. — Shivappa Fakirappa Shetsanadi v Kannappa Mallappa Shetsanadi, ILR 1987 Kar. 3155 (DB).



When powers are enumerated, the power vested in the authority is restricted by the terms of the section and they cannot be allowed to exercise jurisdiction outside the same under the guise of ancillary power. The Act makes full and complete provision for dealing with the land as per the situation as exists on the date of the Act. Thereafter, the possession of the land may changes hands and various inter se disputes between the parties may arise which will have to be determined independently on the basis of the rights of parties. That power can be exercised only by ordinary Civil Courts and such vide powers cannot be assumed by Revenue Authorities under the guise of an ancillary power, especially, when it affects private rights of the parties. The Act makes provisions for resumption of land from the holders of village office and thereafter to make a re-grant in accordance with Sections 5 to 7. It provides a complete machinery for dealing with lands coming under the act. The purpose of the Act is achieved by regrant of the land to eligible persons. Thereafter, it becomes the property of the grantee and the ordinary remedy should be resorted to, if there is any invasion of that right. After the land is regranted, the purpose is accomplished and thereafter the authorities under the Act have no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings to put the grantee in possession of the same which has to be obtained through the ordinary Civil Court. The object of the Act is fully achieved by the regrant order in favour of eligible persons. The Stale is divested of its title by the regrant and the provisions of the Act cannot thereafter be invoked to settle the rights of parties for all times to come in the guise of an ancillary power. By the regrant the authorities under the Act becomes functus offido and the settlement of rights between the parties thereafter has to be done in the ordinary manner by the ordinary Civil Courts. The Tahsildar has no jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 7 of the Act as the writ petitioner is not an 'unauthorised holder' as defined under Section 2{m) of the Act. Moreover, the regrant order was passed in 1979 itself and the State is divested of its title. Thereafter, at any rate, the Tahsildar has no jurisdiction to resume the land from the possession of the writ petitioner even if his possession is unlawful. It is for the title holder to seek appropriate remedies before the Civil Court to get possession of the land which he is entitled to. — V. Channanarasimhaiah v Additional Tahsildar, Bangalore North Taluk and Others, 1997(3) Kar. LJ. 101C (DB).












Alienation of regranted 'service inam land' during 1-2-1963 to 7-8-1978 valid — Any holder of a village office or any authorised holder has a vested right to obtain regrant of the service inam land held by him immediately before 1-2-1963 subject to payment of occupancy price in terms of the Act — Alienation between 1-2-1962 and 7-8-1978 by holder or an authorised holder before regrant is not invalid — However alienee will be a person with imperfect title entitled to continue in possession — When land regranted to alienor, title obtained by alienor will enure to the benefit of alienee — Date of regrant whether before or after 7-8-1978 will not be relevant to determine the validity of alienation between 1-2-1963 and 7-8-1978 — Alienee has no right to seek regrant in his own name — No provision in the Act authorising the Slate Government or its authorities to evict an alienee under an alienation made between 1-2-1963 and 7-8-1978 — Section 7 not applicable as such an alienee is not an 'unauthorised holder'.

Questions Formulated:
(i) Whether the alienee from a 'holder of village office' of 'authorised holder' under an alienation which took place after the appointed date on which the Principal Act came into force (1-2-1963) and before the Amendment Act came into force (7-8-1978) would acquire title even if the regrant under Section 5 or 6, as the case may be, is after 7-8-1978.
(ii) Alternatively, whether the alienation of a service inam land by the holder or authorised holder, in favour of an alienee, made between 1-2- 1963 and 7-8-1978 would become null and void, if the regrant under Section 5 or 6 was not made in favour of the alienor before 7-8-1978?
(iii) Whether the above questions are decided in Lakshmana Gowda's case?

Held: (a) Alienation of regranted 'service inam land' during the period 1-2-1963 to 7-8-1978 is valid and permission for sale is only a formality as the Deputy Commissioner was bound to give permission on mere payment of an amount equal to 15 times of land assessment.
(b) Under Sections 5(1) and 6 of the Act, any holder of a village office or any authorised holder, has a vested right to obtain regrant of the service inam land, which was held by him immediately before 1-2-1963 (that is as at the end of 31-1-1963) subject to payment of occupancy price in terms of the Act and the Rules; the fact that the holder or authorised holder had alienated the land and divested himself of possession of the land after 1-2-1963 and before 7-8-1978 will not disentitle him, to regrant under Section 5(1) or 6 of the Act, as what is relevant for regrant is holding of such land as at the end of 31-1-1963.
(c) Alienation of service inam land between 1-2-1963 and 7-8-1978, by a holder or an authorised holder before regrant, is not invalid, as he had a vested right to get regrant and as there was no bar regarding alienation during that period; but the alienee will be a person with imperfect title entitled to continue in possession and when the land is regranted to the alienor, the title obtained by the alienor will enure to the benefit of the alienee;
(d) The date of regrant, whether before or after 7-8-1978, will not be relevant to determine the validity of the alienation between 1-2-1963 and 7-8-1978, as what is prohibited after 7-8-1978 prospectively fora period of 15 years, is alienation and not regrant.
(e) The alienee between 1-2-1963 and 7-8-1978 has no right to seek regrant in his own name and his right is only to claim the benefit of doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel as and when regrant is made to his alienor under Section 5(1) or 6; and for this purpose he may support or pursue any application for regrant in favour of his alienor;
(f) There is no provision in the Act authorising the State Government or its authorities to evict an alienee under alienation made between 1-2-1963 and 7-8-1978. Section 7 is not applicable; as such an alienee is not an 'unauthorised holder'. If the land alienated between 1-2-1963 and 7-8-1978, is subsequently regranted to the alienor, the benefit of such regrant, namely, title will enure to the benefit of the alienee. If the land is not regranted to the alienor, but to some one else on the ground that the alienor is not a 'holder' or 'authorised holder', then the alienee will be in the position of a transferee from a person without any title; and the grantee to whom the regrant is made, will be entitled to obtain possession from the alienee and the limitation for such grantee to dispossess the alienee will commence from the date of regrant. — Syed Bhasheer Ahamed and Others v State of Karnataka and Others, 1994(1) Kar. L.J. 385 (FB).








Regrant — Of service inam land resumed by State Government on abolition of village offices — Requirements to be satisfied by applicant seeking regrant — He must prove that he was holder of village office immediately prior to appointed date and that occupancy price in respect of land has been paid by him to Government — Applicant need not necessarily be in possession of land and cultivating it and paying land revenue in respect thereof — If he is not in possession, it is open to him to pursue remedy for recovery of possession, and this question arises only after regrant — Similarly liability to pay land revenue arises only after regrant — Order of Tahsildar rejecting regrant solely on ground that applicant was not in possession of land and that he was not paying land revenue is erroneous in law.
Held.—A plain reading of Section 5 together with Rules 4 and 5 makes the legal position clear that an applicant for regrant of the service Inam land will have to fulfill only two legal requirements to entitle him to the regrant of the land/lands. They are: that he was the holder of the village office immediately prior to the appointed day, and, nextly, that the requisite occupancy price calculated in the manner stated in sub-section (1) of Section 5 had been duly credited by him. The later portion of sub-section (1) of Section 5 stipulates that the liability to make payment of the land revenue for such lands arises only after the inam land is regranted to the concerned village office holder, which part of Section 5(1) creates liability on the regrantee to pay the land revenue to the Government with respect to the regranted inam land from the appointed date and in accordance with the provisions of land Revenue Act and the Rules and the orders made thereunder. From the above requirements of Section 5 of the Act, it legally follows that for entitlement to regrant of the service Inam land, the village office holder need not necessarily be in actual possession and cultivation of that land and that the payment of land revenue with respect thereto from the appointed day is also not a condition precedent for the same. It is left open for him to pursue the remedy to recover possession of the land in due course of law after the same is regranted to him. The finding of the Tahsildar in his impugned order that appellant (petitioner) was dis-entitled to regrant of the land simply because he had failed to pay the land revenue with respect thereto is clearly an erroneous finding in law. The learned District Judge has also committed an error in upholding the order of the Tahsildar. — G. V. Subba Rao v Tahsildar, Chickkaballapur Town, Kolar District and Others, 1998(3) Kar. L.J. 413-A (DB).







There were only two courses legally open to the Tahsildar in the circumstances of the case. One course was to reject the application for regrant if reasons demanded and order eviction and the other course was to order regrant of the land to refrain from eviction. Strangely enough in this case, on the one hand eviction notice is issued in 1979 and on the other regrant is made in 1981. It is only to point out the vagaries of revenue officials who do not exercise due diligence in the performance of their statutory duties, I have to make this observation. If the application for regrant filed in 1968 had been disposed of within a reasonable time, perhaps there would have been no occasion for issue of eviction notices to the petitioners. . . .The order of regrant passed subsequently has rendered the order of eviction nugatory and the same are wholly unsustainable since the applications for regrant were under consideration when the said orders came to be passed. ... .In the circumstances, the authorities concerned are directed to regularise the transfer of lands by the original holders to the petitioners on payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the lands in question and to carry out the necessary transfer of Khatha in order to perfect the title of the petitioner within a time of sixty days. — Sanna Beere Gowda v The Tahsildar, Arsikere Taluk and Others, 1989(2) Kar. L.J. 245.





In the case of 'walikarki' properties, when a regrant is made in the name of one of the members of the family, who was performing the walikarki services, the grant ensures to the benefit of all the holders of that office in the family and the members of the family have a right to claim partition in the said regranted land. Appanna and Others v Lakkappa Devappa, 1983(1) Kar. L.J. 482


Section 5 — Regrant of land to holder of village office on payment of occupancy price to Government — Tahsildar to entertain only one application from holder of erstwhile village office and to make only one grant — Person claiming to be member of joint family of holder cannot make application — Property would be available for partition only after grant — Partition is a matter to be decided by competent Court — Tahsildar has no power to partition property while passing order regranting land. Patel Veerabasappa (dead) by LRs. v Smt. Basamma (dead) by LR. and Another, 1996(2) Kar. LJ. 102.




A grant of land resumed under Section 4 to the holder of the Village Office has to be regarded as compensation to the holder of the village Office. Until the lands are regranted to the holder of the Village Office, other members of the family derive no title, assuming that the watan was family property which was impartible until its abolition. It is too premature for them to institute a suit for partition before regrant is obtained by the holder of the Village Office. — Chadrabai v Laxmibai, 1975(1) Kar. L.J. Jr. 4 Sh. N. 19.




Sections 5 and 7 — As amended by Act 13 of 1978 — Thoti Inamthi land — Purchaser from Regrantee — Regrant under Section 5 and subsequent to alienation — Alienation after coming into force of Principal Act but before Amendment in 1978 came into force — Purchaser from Regrantee entitled to benefit flowing from regrant — Case-law discussed. — Smt, Sarojamma v State of Karnataka and Others, 1989(2) Kar. LJ. 88.





Sections 5 and 7 — As amended by Karnataka Act No. 13 of 1978 — Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 43 — Service inam land — Alienation of — Eviction of alienee and applicability of doctrine of feeding grant by estoppel to his case — Alienation by erstwhile holder of village office after vesting of land in State Government consequent upon abolition of village offices — Alienation confers no title on alienee — No provision in Act for regularisation of such alienation, and alienee cannot seek it, nor can he seek regrant in his favour — Right to regrant vests only with erstwhile holder of village office or his heir and regrant is to be made only in his favour — Since land, on such regrant, is not inalienable, such regrant, when made, enures to benefit of alienee, who can then seek application of doctrine to his case if eviction proceedings are initiated against him.Held: In the present case the deeds of transfer were made in between 12-5-1969 and 17-6-1974 and regrant was made in 1987. There is no provision in the Act which says that such a regularisation should be granted. It may be that when proceedings for eviction are taken against the petitioner, it would be open to the petitioner to claim the benefit after showing and establishing the material conditions applicable in the light of Section 43. Until proceedings are not taken for eviction under law, the petitioner will always be entitled to remain in possession, in spite of regrant order made in favour of the village office holders. When proceedings for eviction to evict the petitioner are taken, he may be entitled to take this plea and if he establishes that he is entitled to the benefit of doctrine of estoppel feeding the grant, he may not be evicted. — T. Ramareddy v The Tahsildar, Bangarpet Taluk, Kolar District and Others, 2000(2) Kar. L.J. 230.





Sections 5 and 7 — Sale of lands attached to inferior village of a Village Officer prior to 7-8-1978 — Order of regrant made subsequently on 31-5-1983 — Held, purchaser entitled for benefits of regrant. — Kempanna v State of Karnataka and Others, 1987(2) Kar. LJ. 263.




Sections 5 and 7 — Service inam land — Regrant of — Holder of village office has vested right to obtain regrant of such land held by him immediately before 1-2-1963, the date on which Act came into force — Alienation of land made after 1-2-1963 is not invalid, but alienee gets only imperfect title which, however, becomes perfect when re-grant is made under Section 5 of Act in favour of alienor — Such alienee with imperfect title is not unauthorised holder — Power vested in authority by Section 7 of Act to evict unauthorised holder and restore land to grantee cannot be invoked against such alienee. Held.—Section 7 of the Act deals with eviction of unauthorised holders and the regrant of such lands, after resuming the same, from unauthorised holders. Section 7 provides that, if any land resumed under Section 4(2) is in possession of unauthorised holder, he shall be summararily evicted therefrom and the lands shall be taken possession of by the Deputy Commissioner, in accordance with law, after giving an opportunity to the person in possession to make a representation. Section 7(3) provides that the land which is resumed from an unauthorised holder, shall be granted to holder of such office if it was granted or continued in respect of or annexed to an inferior village office. ..... The object of enactment is to abolish the village offices and to resume the lands in possession of such holders, to whom lands were granted as inam for the service. After resuming the land, provision is also made under Sections 5 to 7 to regrant the land practically in favour of the original holders or in some cases to the authorised holders. Section 5 of the Act provides for regrant of the land to holders of the office. Section 7 would apply only if a person is an 'unauthorised holder' as defined under the Act, on the date of coming into force of the Act. The definition of 'unauthorised holder' itself makes it clear that, he is a person in possession of land without any right or under an alienation which is null and void under the existing law relating to such village ...... Section 7(3) of the Act provides for regrant of the land after getting possession of the land from the unauthorised holder. Section 7 is also one of the modes of regrant along with Sections 5 and 6. This provision contained in Section 7 of the Act is one of the modes of regrant after resuming the land from the unauthorised holder and that it cannot be pressed into service for resuming the land from the possession of a person who comes into possession of the land after 1-2-1963, whether under a valid alienation or an invalid alienation. On a plain reading of the provisions contained in the Act, the provision of Section 7 can be invoked only as against 'unauthorised holders' who are in possession of the land as on 1-2-1963 and that it cannot be invoked in respect of persons eventhough they are in unauthorised occupation who corne into possession of the land only after 1-2-1963. If the land is to be resumed from any such persons, it is not to be done under the power vested under Section 7 but under any other provisions of law, by which, the authorities may be entitled to resume such lands. V. Channanarasimhaiah v Additional Tahsildar, Bangalore North Taluk and Others, 1997(3) Kar. L.J. 101-A (DB).









Sections 5 and 7 — Service inam land — Regrant of — Once regrant of land is
made under Section 5 of Act in favour of erstwhile holder, State is divested of its title and State cannot subsequently invoke provisions of Section 7 of Act to resolve disputes that may arise between grantees inter se or between grantees and alienees — Where land regranted was partitioned among grantees and part of land alienated before partition came as share of one party, that party cannot seek eviction of alienee under Section 7(3) of Act.
V. Channanarasimhaiah v Additional Tahsildar, Bangalore North Taluk and Others, 1997(3) Kar. L.J. 101-B (DB).




.
This is a Revision Petition filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against an order passed by the lower Court in an appeal preferred before it. In such a proceeding, even if it is referred to a Division Bench, it is not open to a Division Bench to go into the correctness of the order passed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution even if it is passed by a learned Single Judge. The order passed under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution can be corrected either in an appeal preferred against that order or in a Review petition preferred against the very order or by a superior Court and not in a subsequent proceeding coming under a different jurisdiction. Therefore, even if it is one of the reasons given in the order of reference, it does not extend the scope of the case that is referred to a Division Bench. The case that is referred to a Division Bench is a Revision Petition preferred against an order passed by the lower Court holding that the appeal preferred under Section 3(2) of the Act is maintainable. Therefore, the contention that the correctness of the order passed in Writ Petition No. 3543 of 1986 is also required to be gone into, cannot be accepted. It is also not possible to accept this contention and hold that a mere fact that the case is being considered by a Division Bench and all the parties are before the Court will not enable the Court to consider all other controversies between the parties which do not really arise in the instant Civil Revision Petition. The inherent jurisdiction of the Court cannot be exercised by clutching at the jurisdiction. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that in this proceeding, this Court can go into the question as to whether the regularisation of the sale made in respect of the entire land is valid in law. The proper remedy open to the petitioner is to challenge the order of the Tahsildar under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution as the order is the one passed under Section 5(3) of the Act as it stood before the coming into force of Karnataka Act 13 of 1978. — B. Rudraiah v S.N. Prahalada Rao and Others, ILR 1991 Kar. 513 (DB).






In the instant case, it is nobody's case that the petitioner obtained necessary sanction from the Competent Authority before the said lease was granted. In the absence of such a sanction, any lease that is granted by the watandar could not confer any right upon the person said to be enjoying the leasehold rights, in respect of the service Inam land. According to Section 8, a person in lawful possession and enjoyment of a land on valid lease recognised by law, can invoke the provisions of Section 8 of the Act, for grant of occupancy rights. It is clear that even under the Bombay Act, alienation of service Inam land is prohibited, without the sanction of the Competent Authority. Respondents 2 to 4 were found to be squatting on the Government land as unauthorised holders. Since they have failed to establish any case under the Bombay Act as the lawful lessees, they are liable to be evicted under Section 7 of the Act. In other words, the action taken by the Assistant Commissioner under Section 7 of the Act, pursuant to the order of regrant made in favour of the petitioner in 1969, is perfectly justified. — Gundu v Assistant Commissioner, Belgaum and Others, ILR 1992 Kar. 324.



Sections 7 and 8 — Regrant — Third party in unauthorised occupation — Remedy.
Venkataramiah, J.—Section 7 of the Act does not apply to a case where the land has already been regranted in favour of the holder of the office. If a person in whose favour the land is regranted finds that a third party is in unauthorised occupation of the land in question, it is open to him to approach the Civil Court to pass a decree for possession against the trespasser. He cannot request the Deputy Commissioner under Section 7 of the Act to evict the trespasser and put him in possession of the land. Section 8 of the Act also does not confer on the person in whose favour the land is granted the right to approach the Deputy Commissioner to evict the third party. — Bapu Mallu Khot v Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum, ILR 1976 Kar. 92.















KARNATAKA LAND LAWS